Case Analysis of Dispute between Baoneng and Vanke‐Based on Anti‐takeover Perspective

Yaping Guo

《World Scientific Research Journal》 7卷2期 (2021/02) Pp. 222-227

https://doi.org/10.6911/WSRJ.202102_7(2).0028

摘要

This article analyzes Vanke's performance characteristics, equity characteristics to explain why Vanke was the target. Also this article performs the analysis of the motivation of Vanke's anti‐acquisition, Vanke's public opinion strategy, suspension strategy, knight knight, and legal proceedings. Second, this case has taken typical antitakeover measures, but it has not played a good turnaround, which reflects the status of anti‐acquisition of listed companies in China's capital market. Finally, in order to solve these problems, it puts forward a feasible strategic proposal for other listed companies to anti‐takeover under the current legal framework.

關鍵字

The battle between Baoneng and Vanke ； Anti‐takeover motivation ； Anti‐takeover strategy

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