- 期刊
Research on Port Emission Reduction Investment Based on Hotelling Game Model
摘要
In order to avoid the negative impact of carbon trading mechanism on port operations and meet the growing low carbon demand of customers, how to scientifically formulate emission reduction strategies has become an urgent problem to be solved in the development of China's port industry. Through the establishment of the port competition model, the optimal pricing and emission reduction strategies of the port were obtained by using the Nash equilibrium game. Finally, the reduction strategies and profit performance of the two container terminals were compared and analyzed. The results show that the government carbon quota allocation method will not affect the pricing and emission reduction decisions of the two ports, but will affect the profit of the port list. The carbon emission reduction investment decision of the port depends on the combined effects of the port's carbon emission cost coefficient, carbon trading price and customer's carbon sensitivity coefficient. The port with low carbon emission reduction cost coefficient is suitable for carbon emission reduction investment to maximize profit. The port with large carbon emission reduction cost coefficient is suitable for controlling the total operating cost to maximize profit.