This paper studies the secondary green supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and establishes a Stackelberg game model that considers retailers' fairness concerns and consumers' green awareness when leading manufacturers invest in green emission reduction technologies. Analyze the optimal pricing strategy of the supply chain under the centralized and decentralized decision-making, and use the Nash bargaining fairness concern equilibrium point as a reference point to establish a fair utility function to compare the optimal pricing strategies under each mode, and finally make it fair through the revenue sharing contract The green supply chain of concern behavior retailers has been coordinated and optimized. Studies have shown that: (1) The increase in consumers' green awareness has expanded the demand for the green market, but it will increase the fairness concerns of retailers; (2) The green market service coefficient affects the supply chain's pricing decisions, and the green market The service factor is determined by the consumer's green awareness and the manufacturer's emission reduction cost factor; (3) The introduction of revenue sharing contracts can effectively increase supply chain profits under decentralized decision-making, enabling manufacturers and retailers to achieve Pareto improvements at the same time.