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Asymmetric Information Commitment and Punishment Game Model of Agricultural Products Supply Chain

摘要


With the rise of new consumption models such as e-commerce and micro-commerce, the sale of agricultural products has also adopted a new supply chain model. In order to solve the more prominent problem in the new agricultural product supply chain-demand information asymmetry, this article will select the agricultural product sales secondary supply chain under the micro-business model to study, and aim at the information asymmetry that is likely to occur in this type of supply chain. The problems that affect the stability of the supply chain are studied from two aspects. By designing the commitment penalty model of the supplier on the secondary supply chain, the game process based on the commitment penalty contract is constructed; according to the content of the model, the corresponding game experiment pair model is designed Scientifically verify.

參考文獻


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