- 期刊
違憲審查還是超級上訴審？－德國審查模式及憲法法庭判決的觀察
Constitutional Review or the Supreme Appeal Trial?: Observations on the German Review Model and the Judgment of the Constitutional Court
摘要
憲法訴訟法引進的裁判憲法審查制度，促使並課與憲法法庭介入了一般法院職掌的個人權利保護之救濟，同時，誠如所繼受的德國法，我國亦無可避免的引發了施行裁判憲法審查制度最大的難題：憲法法院行使裁判憲法審查權限之界線，即憲法法院對終審法院裁判之審查究係違憲審查？抑或是進一步質變為超級上訴審？本文從比較法觀點闡述德國審查模式、操作難題及修正準則，據此探討我國憲法法庭審查終審法院裁判的主要憲法上基礎，並檢視分析幾則憲法法庭行使裁判憲法審查所作成之判決的論證及相關問題。
並列摘要
The adjudication system of the constitutional review introduced by the Constitutional Court Procedure Act has prompted and enabled the constitutional court to intervene in the relief of personal rights protection under the jurisdiction of the general courts. Simultaneously, the German law adopted in Taiwan has inevitably caused the biggest problem in implementing the judicial constitutional review system: the boundary of the constitutional court's power to review constitutional judgments. That is, the constitutional court's review of the court of final appeal's judgments is a constitutional review or has it further transformed into a supreme appeal trial? This article delineates the German constitutional review model, operational difficulties, and revision guidelines from a comparative law perspective. Accordingly, this article explores the fundamental constitutional basis for the Constitutional Court in Taiwan to review the judgments of the court of final appeal, and examines as well as analyzes several arguments and relevant issues in the constitutional court's exertion of judgments of the constitutional review.