- 學位論文
宅配到府或是到店取貨?線上零售商與實體零售商間的競合關係
To door or to store? Coopetition among online sellers and physical retailers
摘要
近年來網路科技的蓬勃發展，傳統實體零售商面對更多的可能性和威脅。其中，線上賣家額外具有競爭力，因為他們無需支付運營實體店的成本。但我們也觀察到，線上賣家可能會發現實體零售商所經營的實體店面對他們有所助益。其中一個例子，便是在台灣的便利商店中，存在「網上訂購、到店取貨」的服務。在本文中，我們欲探討線上賣家和實體零售商之間的競合行為。透過賽局理論模型，考慮線上賣家和實體零售商在運輸服務上的合作，同時在銷售產品上競爭。本文中將透過兩個階段的購買過程，分析線上賣家與實體零售商的外溢效果 (spillover effect)和競爭效果(competition effect)。我們也分別分析了單產品分散式通路、雙產品整合通路和雙產品分散式通路中線上賣家與實體零售商的利潤差異。在本文中，以前兩種通路結構作為基準，比較並量化外溢效果、競爭效果 及雙重邊際化效果(double marginalization)。 我們的研究主要有三個結論。第一，在雙產品整合通路的情況下，市場最有可能被完全覆蓋，意即所有的消費者皆會購買產品。其次，我們發現不論市場被完全覆蓋或是部分覆蓋，外溢效果都會發生；但競爭效果僅在市場被完全覆蓋時發生。最後，如同其他通路結構研究，本文模型中同樣存在雙重邊際化效果。
並列摘要
For traditional physical retailers, the rise of Internet provides more possibility and threat. Obviously, online sellers are competitive as they do not pay costs to operate physical stores. Interestingly, online seller may find their physical competitors’ stores helpful. One example is the “order online, pick up at store” practice that exists among convenience stores in Taiwan. In this study, we focus on the coopetition between online sellers and physical retailers. We construct a game-theoretical model and consider an online seller and a physical retailer cooperating while competing to sell two products. We formulate and capture the spillover and competition effects for the two players in a two-stage purchasing process. We analyze the online seller's and physical retailer's profits in the single-product decentralized channel, two-product integrated channel, and two-product decentralized channel. The first two channel structures are the benchmarks to quantify the spillover, competition, and double marginalization effects. There are three main results in our study. First, full coverage is the most likely to happen under the two-product integrated channel and the least likely to happen under the single-product decentralized channel. Second, we figure out the spillover effect always exists in the two-product market, and the competition effect happens under full coverage. Third, we also notice the double marginalization in our model.