- 學位論文
論我國股份有限公司股東會與董事會之權限劃分——以專屬權限為中心
Research on the Allocation of Powers between Shareholders' Meeting and Board of Directors under Taiwan's Companies Limited by Shares: Centered on the Exclusive Powers
摘要
股東會與董事會之權限劃分乃公司法制永恆之課題。我國之權限劃分政策長期以來均混沌不明，本文之目的乃解決我國公司法制現存之爭議，包含各機關之專屬權限範圍、權限分配之特殊情況與股東提案權之相關問題。實則，釐清我國最上位之權限劃分政策始為正本清源之道，蓋舉凡各制度之解釋論、商業實務運作之容許性均繫諸於政策上採擇之路徑。藉由回顧我國現有制度與相關文獻、比較法之借鏡與評析，本文期能重塑我國權限劃分法制，並提供其更妥適之政策路徑與配套措施。 首先，本文概述我國權限劃分法制之現狀與疑難。我國公司法第202條固然將業務經營之權限廣泛授予董事會，惟爭議並不因此止息。相反地，修法趨勢雖可見我國愈發重視董事會之功能與地位，惟規範文義存在之曖昧空間對董事會優位主義之「勝利」提出質疑。種種疑難均指向「董事會專屬權限」，其範圍之劃定亦有助於釐清我國之權限劃分政策。此外，爭議亦萌生於「權限分配之特殊情況」與「股東提案權之範圍」，本文指明：該等爭議實際上均源於我國權限劃分政策之不明所致。 綜合相關文獻與比較法之經驗，本文主張第202條之文義應作適度之調整，且第202條與第193條間之衝突可透過「股東會至上理念之揚棄」予以解套。與此同時，我國法制之其他爭議亦得因此獲得適當之解釋與結論；次之，無論世界各國均容許小型企業自行安排內部之權限劃分，鑒於小型企業之特徵與較低之管制必要性，本文呼籲我國正視非公開發行公司之治理需求，並破除董事會專屬權限之存在。 「公開發行公司」中股東會與董事會之「專屬權限」厥為本文之研究核心。藉由若干不同之論證模式，本文提出個人淺見：我國宜比照英國法路徑，採取「無董事會專屬權限」之立場。其一，藉由美國本土發生之股東賦權論辯，本文以此為借鏡評析英美法路徑之優劣之處，最終主張美國式的「法定董事會優位主義」缺乏有力論據，英國法之「自治」精神洵屬較為適宜之政策選擇；其二，透過權限分配規範「強行化」之反思，本文主張我國法明文應經股東會決議之事項均有強行化之必要——除董事報酬之決定與盈餘分派之決定，惟明文應經董事會決議之事項卻未必如此，似解釋為「預設規定」為宜；其三，本文個別性地針對特定事項進行分析，探究其是否應專屬於特定機關。本文主張「董事報酬之決定」、「盈餘分派之決定」並不具有專屬於股東會之必要性與正當性，惟亦無須賦予董事會專屬地位，由企業自行擇定決定機關屬較為適宜之路徑；於個別分析「經理人之任免與報酬事宜」、「發行新股」、「共享權限事項之提案權」後，本文主張「發行新股」權限並無專屬於董事會之正當性。現階段若欲就「經理人之任免與報酬事宜」與「共享權限事項之提案權」破除董事會之專屬地位則仍有困難，惟若未來相關見解發展成熟、配套措施得以改善，或有採納餘地。 最後，為因應採取英國法路徑之潛在疑慮，本文建議以「表決權行使之衡平界限」應對「少數股東保障」之困境，尤應以後階段之「權限行使」為審查重心，以免損及英國法之精神；此外，本文主張藉由「董事會之資訊揭露」、「機構投資人功能之重視」與「股東提案權制度之改革與救濟」作為「強化股東會功能」之對策，期能為英國法路徑建構更完善之法制背景。
並列摘要
The allocation of powers between shareholders' meeting and board of directors is an eternal issue in corporate law. Taiwan’s policy regarding the allocation of powers has long been ambiguous. The purpose of this thesis is to resolve the existing disputes over our corporate legal system, including issues related to the exclusive powers of shareholders' meeting and board of directors, abnormal cases, and shareholder proposal rights. In fact, it’s essential to clarify the top-level policy on the allocation of powers as interpretations of various articles and permissibility in business practices are contingent on the chosen policy. By reviewing Taiwan’s current system, relevant literature, and drawing comparisons with other legal systems, this thesis aims to reshape the Taiwan’s legal framework of the allocation of powers and provide a more appropriate policy and corresponding measures. This thesis begins by overviewing the current state and disputes over Taiwan’s legal framework of the allocaton of powers. While Article 202 of Taiwan’s Corporate Law broadly delegates business decision-making powers to board of directors, disputes persist. Although trends in legal amendments suggest a growing emphasis on the functions and role of the board of directors, the ambiguity in its interpretation casts doubts on the victory of director-primacy view. Most questions relate to the "exclusive powers of the board of directors," and defining its scope contributes to clarifying Taiwan's policy. Disputes also arise in "abnormal cases of power allocation" and "the scope of shareholder proposal rights", originating from the lack of clarity in our policy. Based on relevant literature and experiences from comparative legal systems, this thesis suggests that the interpretation of Article 202 should be moderately adjusted, and conflicts between Article 202 and 193 can be resolved by abandoning the "shareholder primacy" view. Simultaneously, other disputes over our legal system can gain appropriate interpretations and conclusions. Moreover, countries around the world allow small companies to arrange their powers of allocation. Given the characteristics of small companies and the lower necessity for regulation, this thesis calls on Taiwan to address the governance needs of non-public companies and to eliminate exclusive powers of the board of directors. The "exclusive powers" of shareholders and directors in public companies serves as the core of this thesis. Through various aspects, this thesis suggests that Taiwan should follow the U.K. approach, embracing the model which "no directors’ exclusive power" exists. Firstly, by reviewing the “shareholder empowerment” debate in the U.S., this thesis evaluates the merits and demerits of the U.S. and the U.K. model, ultimately asserting that the U.S. "statutory director primcy approach" lacks strong foundations, and the spirit of "autonomy" of the U.K. model is more suitable for Taiwan; Secondly, through reflecting on the "mandatory" nature of regulations of power allocation, this thesis claims that matters requiring the approval of shareholder’s meeting according to the statutes should be mandatory—except for decisions on directors’ remuneration and dividends. On the other hand, matters requiring board’s resolution based on the statutes seems more appropriate to be interpreted as "default rules"; Thirdly, this thesis individually analyzes specific issues to determine if they should be exclusive to specific organs. It asserts that decisions on "directors’ remuneration " and "dividends" aren’t necessarily exclusive to shareholder’s meeting, nor do they essentially fall into the hand of board of directors. Instead, it’s more appropriate to provide companies with the freedom to decide the decision-making organ. For specific analyses of "appointment and remuneration of executives", " issuing new shares ", and " the proposal right for shared powers", this thesis contends that the exclusivity of the directors’ position is not justified for "issuing new shares." Although eliminating the exclusive position of the directors is challenging for " appointment and remuneration of executives" and "proposal right for shared powers" at this stage, there might be room for adoption in the future if related opinions are mature enough and corresponding measures are improved. Finally, to address potential concerns arising from the U.K. model, this thesis suggests dealing with the "protection of minority shareholders" issue by "substantial boundaries and limits for shareholders voting", especially focusing on the review of the later stage—"exercise of powers" to prevent compromising the spirit of the U.K. model. Additionally, improving the functions of shareholders' meeting could be achieved through approaches such as "disclosure of information from the directors", "emphasis on the functions of institutional investor", and " the reform and remedies of shareholder’s proposal rights." The aim is to construct a more comprehensive legal background for adopting the U.K. model.