自迴避規定探討股東及董事利害衝突規範架構

觀察我國對股東和董事於股東會或董事會中決議事項具備利害關係時之規範，目前主要圍繞以排除表決權為主要規範手段，即公司法第 178 條及第 206 條。儘管長期以來學者多有認為以迴避方式限制股東利害衝突行為欠缺正當性，立法者卻從未修正公司法第 178 條;反而在公司法第 206 條部分則積極回應學者之討論往趨於嚴格的方向加強規範。而在立法者於公司法堅持保留以迴避作為規範手段的同時，企業併購法第 18 條第 6 項卻自立法以來始終規定利害關係股東和董事不需迴避。尤其在 770 號解釋中，大法官多數意見更是明文表示認同企業併購交易免於適用迴避規定之立法方式。面對以上三條法條間在學界及立法者討論中出現之衝突點，本文退一步從整體利害衝突規範之規範法理基礎開始分析，嘗試找尋限制股東和董事利害衝突行為之理由。藉由闡述不同之法理基礎，確立對股東和董事設計不同利害衝突規範架構之正當性，並且畫出利害衝突規範適用之客體和主體範圍。接著再觀察諸多比較法關於利害衝突之規範，發現比較法中大多採用之規範手段不外乎足夠資訊揭露以及由無利害衝突之人表決。參考比較法以及本文提出之規範基礎，探尋適合我國司法效率、持股結構和公司實務運作之規範手段，並且建構公司內部程序規範與法院審查標準之互動。本文之架構與現行法最大之差異有二。一、公司若有經足夠獨立性和專業性之委員會作成決議，則董事會中利害關係董事縱未迴避亦非違法;二、股東會決議中若於足夠期間前提供非利害關係股東足夠利害衝突相關資訊，則利害關係股東亦可不需於股東會中迴避。而就企業併購交易中之利害衝突，本文並不認為應與公司法中之規範有所差異。在本文建議之架構下，藉由提供股東和董事選擇遵法手段之彈性以及法院審酌之空間，嘗試於無利害關係股東之保護和促進企業併購活動間取得平衡。

關鍵字

表決權迴避；利害衝突；忠實義務；股東平等；資訊揭露

並列摘要

The two current main regulations regarding conflict-of-interest of shareholders and directors in shareholder meetings and board meetings are recusal rules, namely Article 178 and Article 206 of the Taiwan Company Act. Although scholars have long criticized that requiring shareholders to abstain from voting rights due to conflict-of-interest lacks legitimacy, the legislature has never amended Company Act Article 178. Instead, the legislature noticed scholars' discussions on Company Act Article 206 and responded by strengthening the regulation to a stricter direction. In contrast with keeping recusal rules in the Company Act, Article 18, item 6 of the Merger and Acquisition Act has always stipulated that interested shareholders and directors do not need to avoid conflict-of-interest. In particular, in Interpretation No. 770, the majority of the Grand Justices expressed their explicit agreement with the legislative approach of exempting merger and acquisition transactions from recusal regulations. Bearing in mind that there are above-listed issues among the three regulations in academic and legislative discussion, this article started by addresses regulation principles that serve as the foundation of the overall conflict-of-interest regulation framework and justifies the limitations on shareholder and director conflict-of-interest behavior. By clarifying the different legal principles, the legitimacy of designing different conflict-of-interest regulatory frameworks for shareholders and directors is established, and the objective and subjective scope of the conflict-of-interest regulations is outlined. Next, by observing various comparative laws on conflict-of-interest regulations, it is found that the regulatory methods adopted by most comparative laws are “sufficient information disclosure” and “affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors”. Based on the comparative law and the regulatory foundation proposed in this article, in addition to analyses on judicial efficiency, shareholding structure, and corporate practices in Taiwan, this article brings forward different collaborations of internal corporate procedure rules and court review standards, and reconstructed the regulation framework of conflict of interest. There are two major differences between the reconstruction and the current law. First, if a company has a committee with sufficient independence and professionalism to make decisions, a resolution made by the committee can substitute a board meeting with a conflicted director; second, in the shareholder meeting, if sufficient conflict-related information is provided to non-interested shareholders before a sufficient period of time, the interested shareholders may not need to avoid the matter. As for the conflict-of-interest in mergers and acquisitions, this article does not believe that there should be any difference in the regulations from the Company Act. By providing flexibility for shareholders and directors to choose lawful methods and space for court review, this article believes that the proposed framework successfully finds a balance between protecting non-interested shareholders and promoting merger and acquisition activities.