- 學位論文
以未得同意為核心的妨害性自主罪章修訂
The Amendment of Sexual Offenses Chapter in the Criminal Code with Focus on Consent
摘要
刑法中的性自主與一般自由有何不同？1999年修法後，刑法第221條、第224條中增加了「其他違反其意願之方法」，最高法院於97年度第5次刑庭決議後，明白地採取強制手段不要說。這些改變彰顯了性自主的侵害重心在於意願的違反，不必然需要強制手段的實施。事實上，透過檢視我國妨害性自主罪章的各罪以及性騷擾防治法第25條的性騷擾罪，本文指出刑法中本就存在了不使用強制手段、性自主也會遭受侵害的情況。既然現行法中存在這些不需要強制手段，仍侵害了被害人性自主的犯罪類型，其實就暗示了性自主之保護確實不同於需要強暴、脅迫等不法手段侵害才處罰的一般自由。 本文接著說明性的自由與一般自由的不同之處，在於性在文化與道德中的特殊意義。確認性自由不同於一般自由後，本文引用了Isaiah Berlin「消極自由」和「積極自由」的區分，說明性自主的侵害其實包括對性的「消極自由」和「積極自由」的侵害，未使用強制手段的犯罪類型，侵害的就是性的積極自由－個人為性領域中唯一有權決定者。刑法不應只在特定狀況下，處罰對性積極自由之侵害，應該設立一般性的、對性積極自由侵害的處罰，因此本文認為必須修法。 本文在第四章正式介紹加拿大的未得同意模式－本文認為採取「未得同意模式」（yes means yes）比「違反意願模式」（no means no）更貼近對性自主侵害的型態。本文參考了加拿大的模式、研究者提出的同意形式、以及我國判決對於違反意願的判斷後，提出了我國應採取的同意標準：客觀的言語或行為的表達。在第五章，本文以未得同意做為性自主侵害的核心，重新檢視及修正現行刑法第16章的相關規定。
並列摘要
What’s the difference between sexual autonomy and liberty in the Criminal Code? After the amendment of Criminal Code in 1999, Article 221 and 224 added the elemant “other means that agaimst the will”, in 2008, Taiwan Supreme Court concluded that sexual assault no longer established by the proof of using force during 2008 5th Criminal Divisions Conference of the Supreme Court of Taiwan. These changes show that the core of sexual assault is unwillingness, which is not necessarily connected to the use of force. In fact, through examine Sexual Offenses Chapter in the Criminal Code and Article 25 of Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, this article points out that there are certain types of sexual offences that don’t need the proof of using force to establish. Since this kind of offenses exists in current Criminal Code, it implies that the protection of suxual autonomy under Criminal Code is indeed different from the protection of liberty, which requires the proof of using force to establish. This article then elaborates the difference between sexual liberty and general liberty, which is the special meaning of sex that lies in our culture amd sense of morality. After that, this article quotes “negative liberty” and “positive liberty” established by Isaiah Berlin to elaborate that the concept of sexual autonomy includes sexual “negative liberty” and “positive liberty”, and those sexual offences that don’t require the proof of using force are the crimes that violate sexual positive liberty－the individual is his or her own master in the field of sexual contacts. Criminal law should not only punish violations of sexual positive liberty in certain circumstances, but also establish general punishments for violations of positive sexual freedom. Therefore, this article considers that the law must be amended. This article formally introduces the Canadian model of affirmative consent in Chapter 4, and suggests that adopting the "yes means yes" approach is more closely related to violation of sexual autonomy than the "no means no" approach. This article refers to the Canadian model of affirmative consent, the various forms of consent proposed by other scholars, and the judgment of “against the will” in Taiwanese courts, and then proposes the standard of consent that should be adopted: objective expression by words or behaviors. In the fifth chapter, this article takes the consent as the core of violation of sexual autonomy, and re-examines and revises the relevant provisions of Chapter 16 of the current Criminal Code.