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  • 學位論文

當代現象學時間性研究:對保留模型的辯護與修正

Contemporary Temporal Studies in Phenomenology: Defending and Revising the Retentional Model

指導教授 : 陳樂知

摘要


現象學時間性研究的是人的主觀時間經驗層面,而非神經層級或次個人(sub-personal)層級。胡塞爾(Husserl)通過分析時間發生的起源,提出了「保留-原始呈現-預示」(retention-primal presentation-protention)的三重時間結構,為人的意識流的產生提供解釋。當代的現象學研究學者在現象學時間性的基礎上,進一步發展出電影模型(cinematic model)、保留模型(retentional model)和延展模型(extensional model)三種時間模型,但仍存在許多爭議與不足。其一,是「現在的持續時間」存在頗多爭論,這也是三個模型之間的關鍵區別之一,即電影模型和保留模型支持點狀的「現在」,而延展模型支持區塊狀的「現在」;其二,是「時間經驗的認知內容」存在頗多的爭議,特別是「如何知覺運動?」,「如何知覺連續性或變化?」。這是另一個重要的區別,即一般認為,電影模型和保留模型支持靜態的觀點,而延展模型支持動態的觀點。本文的焦點將放在探究保留模型上,為保留模型提供合理的辯護,並對保留模型的不合理之處進行修正。

並列摘要


The study of phenomenological temporality concerns the subjective level of human temporal experience, rather than the neurological or sub-personal level. By analyzing the origin of temporality, Husserl proposed a triple temporal structure of “retention-primal presentation-protention” to provide an explanation for the emergence of human stream of consciousness. Building upon phenomenological temporality, contemporary scholars in phenomenological research have further developed three temporal models, namely, the cinematic model, the retentional model, and the extensional model. But there are still many controversies. First, there are many controversies about the "duration of the present", which constitutes a key distinction among the three models. The cinematic model and the retentional model advocate for a point-like "present," while the extensional model supports a block-like "present." Second, there are many controversies about the “perceptual content of temporal experience," particularly concerning questions such as "how to perceive motion?" and "how to perceive continuity or change?" This represents another significant difference, with the cinematic model and the retentional model generally endorsing a static view, while the extensional model supports a dynamic view. This paper focuses on the examination of the retentional model, aiming to provide a defense of its principles while addressing and rectifying any implausible aspects within the model.

參考文獻


I. 外文部分
一.專書
Baddeley, A.D. (2007), Working Memory, Thought, and Action, New York: Oxford University Press.
Broad, C.D. (1923), Scientific Thought, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2012), The Phenomenological Mind (2nd ed.), London and New York: Routledge.

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