民事訴訟法第447條,其立法意旨為合理分配司法資源,促使當事人適時提出攻防方法,採取「原則禁止、例外准許」提出新攻擊防禦方法之立法模式。但失權規定牽涉當事人受憲法上保障之訴訟權,故於適用失權規定時,亦應適時兼顧當事人之程序保障,以避免過度侵害其實體、程序權。 本文以敘述性統計、卡方檢定、邏輯迴歸針對最高法院之裁判進行分析,結果發現,無法直接評斷有關民訴法第447條案件之上訴率(0.1%)、狹義上訴率(1-2%)、上訴維持率(78%)之高、低與否,仍有待其他研究繼續深入。此外,最高法院之裁判中常以民訴法第447條第1項第3款、第6款作為其判斷基礎,和過往文獻之研究結果相符,但必須注意最高法院對於下級審裁判之審查,原則上受限於原判決確定之事實和當事人上訴聲明,故於下級審大量適用第447條第1項第3款、第6款之前提下,最高法院有此種審查結果即不足為奇,而無法僅以「最高法院大量使用第447條第1項第3款、第6款」,推論其濫用此二款例外事由。 為解決過往文獻之可能偏誤,以準確觀察最高法院是否最傾向適用同條項第3款、第6款准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法,本文分析各種可能之變項,發現最高法院維持下級審裁判與否,和「第二審是否准許新攻擊防禦方法」之間具有強烈之關聯性,即下級審准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法時,該裁判較容易被最高法院維持,故於解釋最高法院之裁判時,不應忽略此項影響因素。 於下級審大量適用第447條第1項第3款、第6款准許提出新攻擊防禦方法,且該裁判又容易經最高法院維持之前提下,究竟係最高法院因避免勞力、時間、費用之浪費,而「傾向維持」下級審適用第447條第1項第3款、第6款准許提出新攻擊防禦方法?抑或是此二款事由較容易該當,而「傾向適用」第447條第1項第3款、第6款准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法?二者不應混淆。為避免上述情形發生,本文認為應觀察最高法院是否較常因「下級審未適用第447條第1項第3款、第6款」而廢棄原判決,始能排除「第二審是否准許新攻擊防禦方法」對最高法院審查結果之影響,並論述最高法院傾向適用第447條第1項第3款、第6款准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法。 研究結果發現,於11則廢棄下級審之裁判中,有9則係以第447條第1項第3款、有7則係以第447條第1項第6款准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法,可見其傾向適用此二款例外事由,准許當事人提出新攻擊防禦方法。此外,最高法院於判斷何謂「顯失公平」時,最常適用「實體利益」作為判准,且有時未將其他訴訟法上之判斷因素綜合衡量,不利於訴訟促進之目的達成。 參考德國民訴法第531條之相關規定後,本文認為,法院對民訴法第447條第1項第3款之「第一審攻擊防禦方法之補充」,應以當事人具有「不可歸責」之事由為前提,且原則上以「抽象輕過失」為標準,但應視當事人之事證蒐集能力、有無律師代理等因素,適時調整;民訴法第447條第1項第6款之顯失公平條款刪除後,可使法院將判斷重心放回當事人未能提出新攻防方法之不可歸責事由,而不再注重當事人之實體利益、訴訟延滯等因素,使本條之立法目的得以貫徹。但最高法院正確認識失權規定為職權事項,並應確保當事人之聽審權之相關見解,值得肯定。 綜上所述,2020年民事訴訟法修法草案將民事訴訟法第447條第1項第3款和第6款刪除,得於確保當事人訴訟權之前提下,完成訴訟制度金字塔化,減輕人民及公益層面訴訟資源之目標,值得贊同。
Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure Article 447 aims to reasonably allocate judicial resources and concentrate the proceeding, adopting the legislative model of "principle prohibition, exception permission" to raise new attacks and defenses. However, the preclusion effect involves the party's constitutional right to litigation, so when applying the preclusion effect, the litigant's procedural protection should also be appropriately considered to avoid excessive infringement of their substantial and procedural rights. This article analyzes the judgments of the Supreme Court using descriptive statistics, chi-square tests, and logistic regression. The results show that it cannot directly judge whether the appeal rate (1%), narrow appeal rate (1-2%), and consistency (78%) in cases related to Article 447 are high or low, and further research is needed. In addition, the Supreme Court often bases its judgment on Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6), which is consistent with the findings of previous literature. It is not surprising that the Supreme Court would have such a finding, and it cannot be inferred that it abused the exceptions to Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6) simply because "the Supreme Court has made extensive use of these two paragraphs. In order to address potential biases in previous literature and accurately assess the Supreme Court's inclination towards the application of Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6), which allow parties to raise new means of attacks and defenses, this article conducts a comprehensive analysis of various factors that may impact the Supreme Court's review. The findings suggest a strong correlation between the Supreme Court's decision to uphold or overturn the lower court's judgment and whether the lower court allowed the raises of new attacks and defenses. It indicates that when the lower court permits parties to raise new attacks and defenses, the Supreme Court is more likely to uphold such a decision. Therefore, it is essential to consider this influential factor when interpreting the Supreme Court's decision. Based on this observation, considering the widespread application of Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6) in the lower courts, which permit raising new attacks and defenses, and the higher likelihood of such decisions being upheld by the Supreme Court, the question arises: Does the Supreme Court tend to "uphold" lower court decisions applying Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6), or does it have a tendency to "apply" Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6), thus allowing parties to raise new attacks and defenses? It is crucial to distinguish between these two possibilities. It is crucial to distinguish between these two possibilities. To avoid confusion, this article suggests observing whether the Supreme Court more frequently "overturns lower court decisions for failure to apply Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6)." This approach helps eliminate the potential influence of lower court decisions on the Supreme Court’s decision. According to the research findings, it is evident that the Supreme Court demonstrates a clear inclination towards utilizing the exceptions provided in 447 Ⅰ (3) and 447 Ⅰ (6) to permit parties to present new attack and defenses. This inclination is supported by the analysis of 11 cases, where 9 cases involved the application of Article 447 Ⅰ (3), and 7 cases involved Article 447 Ⅰ (6). The result shows consistent judicial preference for these exceptions. In addition, it is noteworthy that in the assessment of manifest unfairness, the Supreme Court predominantly relies on the criterion of "substantial interests." While this criterion holds significance in determining fairness, there is a tendency to overlook other factors in procedural laws. This limited consideration may impede the goal of the concentrated proceeding. Referring to relevant provisions of Article 531 of the German Civil Procedure Law, this article believes that when the court supplements "attack and defense in the first instance," it should be based on the premise that the litigant has an "unavoidable" reason, and generally, "abstract negligence" should be used as the standard. However, the court should adjust the degree of attribution according to the litigant's evidence collection ability, whether they have a lawyer and other factors. After deleting the manifestly unfair clause, the court can shift the focus of judgment back to whether the litigant failed to present an unavoidable reason, rather than focusing on their substantive interests or litigation delays, thereby achieving the legislative purpose of this provision. In summary, revising Article 447 Ⅰ (3) and Article 447 Ⅰ (6) can avoid excessive allowing raised new attacks and defenses. The purpose of the 2020 Amendment to the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure ensures the litigant's right to litigation while completing concentrated proceedings, which is worth supporting.