現今我國社會都市計畫發展並離不開公共設施用地的保留,故自1964年以來立法者即迫切需要修正都市計畫法的相關規定以適應城市發展,其中對於人民影響最深遠者莫過於1988年的修正法案,即當時立法者為配合行政院土地預算取得困難,無法按期完成徵收之困境,在未充分考量各方意見的情形下,逕行刪除都市計畫法中有關公共設施保留地取得時限的要求,以舉雖有助於減緩政府巨大的財政壓力,但也留下相當嚴重的隱患。換言之,在目前政府完全欠缺財政支持的情形下,對於設施用地的保留動輒數十年,並且隨著保留時間的不斷延長,土地所有人在此期間內所受到的土地利用損失也在不斷擴大,對此該如何衡平土地所有人與機關間的衝突,便成為我國法學界相當重要的議題。 因此,本文將從特別犧牲損失補償的觀點出發,探討公共設施用地的保留在何種情形下會構成特別犧牲。然為了要解決上開問題,首先即必須對於我國特別犧牲的判斷標準先行確立,惟對此標準為何我國大法官實則並未提供較為詳細的操作模型。故而,本文將會參考並解析美國管制性準徵收的實務案例,以及德國法上關於特別犧牲理論的說明後,重新建構我國對於財產權特別犧牲形成的審查標準,即在個案中以經濟損害、合理投資期待以及政府管制行為等三項標準進行審查,然而對於公共設施用地的保留不同地區的土地所有人所受到的侵害程度不盡相同,是以在通案上或可以參考德國建設法以及我國法制,認為以5年的時間保留作為已構成特別犧牲的通案限制,且除此之外我國對於保留地的補償是否相當,亦會在本文中進行討論。 而在確立特別犧牲的審查標準後,另一個隨之而來的問題在於土地所有人該如何實現特別犧牲損失補償,換言之,在目前在我國尚未承認人民能以特別犧牲為由逕行向保留機關請求補償的情形下,土地所有人在現實上僅能藉由土地徵收制度來獲得相應的損失補償,惟對此行政法院向來一貫認為在現今土地徵收制度的要求下,土地所有人並不具有向徵收核准機關(即內政部)請求徵收的權利,其理由在於土地所有人並非得以作為請求徵收的主體,並且在法律無明文的情形下人民亦不具有請求徵收的公法上權利。是以,在我國目前的情形下除行政機關主動徵收保留地外,人民幾乎沒有其他主動請求補償的途徑。 然而,對此本文以為多數土地所有人之所以會期望能藉由土地徵收方式來實現特別犧牲補償,乃是考量到土地徵收制度的完善,以及在現今制度下保留地最終還會藉由土地徵收的方式實現,惟此種思考模式將會導致在設施用地保留期間內所產生的特別犧牲問題,被納入在土地徵收制度下的脈絡思考,如此將導致人民在損失補償的請求上往往被侷限於特定框架之上。換言之,行政法院錯誤的將土地所有人對於其土地達到特別犧牲的請求,限縮成是向機關請求進行土地徵收,此舉等同是混淆「特別犧牲損失補償」與「土地徵收制度」間在層次以及補償目的上的不同。況且,若依行政法院認為土地所有人實現特別犧牲損失補償的方式只有請求徵收一途,然在徵收關係中土地所有人作為請求徵收的當事人主體,也並非是本質上不允許,僅僅是在法制上有所欠缺,然而行政法院在實務上卻曾多次以法律程序未規定為由,拒絕人民請求徵收土地以獲得補償的機會。足徵法院目前最大的問題在於混淆「如何補償」以及「是否補償」在層次上的不同,否定人民有主動透過土地徵收來獲取特別犧牲損失補償的權利。是以,本文認為目前行政法院仍在堅守「無法律即無補償」的想法,應不符合人民受憲法財產權保障的意旨。然在司法院大法官第747號解釋做成後,大法官實則已有確認特別犧牲損失補償係基於憲法誡命而生,即有打破「無法律即無補償」的想法,然這是否真能影響行政法院對於土地利用限制而達到特別犧牲時,人民得以此為由請求機關給予補償的見解,也將是本文所要審視的重點之一。然在結論上行政法院不僅限縮司法院釋字747號解釋的適用範圍,更以法律有特別規定為由排除該解釋的適用可能,如此見解仍與特別犧牲理論所強調「有犧牲即有補償」的觀點,相差甚遠。 本文末篇將會探討我國對於設施用地的保留期間是否並無任何限制。換言之,即對於機關劃設保留公共設施用地的都市計畫,人民是否有可能對於都市計畫的違法情形提起救濟,然而過去因都市計畫其具有法規命令的性質,人民在以往並無法對於非具體處分的法律行為提起有效救濟,縱使有學者以為法院得以附帶審查法規命令或以人民提起確認訴訟或與預防性不作為訴訟的方式來進行救濟,然基於個別訴訟類型的局限性人民仍無法獲得有效救濟,行政法院對此也大多採否定意見。惟在司法院釋字第742號解釋以及新修正行政訴訟法都市計畫審查程序篇章後,保留地的土地所有人則首次獲得尋求救濟的機會,對此該如何判斷都市計畫的違法性,即如何衡平都市計畫的形成自由與司法審查界限便成為審查重點,而在公共設施保留地的問題上,本文以為對於超過25年以上保留的公共設施用地,應認為其都市計畫當然違反上位規範與計畫指導原則的要求,並且保留利益與人民所受到的犧牲間不合比例,而具有重大違法性,法院自可以依都市計畫第237-28條的規定宣告都市計畫無效,而在公共設施用地保留所依據的都市計畫無效後,人民應可請求機關盡速解編或變更違法保留之公共設施用地,以此有效落實人民財產權保障的意旨。
In today's society, urban development in our country is inseparable from the reservation of land for public facilities. Therefore, since 1964, legislators have urgently needed to amend the relevant provisions of the Urban Planning Act to accommodate urban development. Among these, the most far-reaching impact on the people came from the 1988 amendment. At that time, in response to the Executive Yuan’s difficulties in securing budget for land acquisition and its inability to complete expropriation on time, legislators, without fully considering various opinions, directly removed the time limit for acquiring land reserved for public facilities from the Urban Planning Act. While this move helped alleviate the government's enormous financial pressure, it also left significant hidden risks. In other words, in the current situation where the government lacks financial support, land reserved for facilities is often held for decades, and as the reservation period extends, the losses suffered by landowners due to restrictions on land use continue to increase. Balancing the conflicts between landowners and government agencies has thus become a crucial issue in the legal community of our country. Therefore, this article will explore, from the perspective of special sacrifice compensation, under what circumstances the reservation of land for public facilities constitutes a special sacrifice. However, to resolve this issue, we must first establish the standards for determining special sacrifice in our country. The Constitutional Court has not provided detailed operational models for this standard. Thus, this article will refer to and analyze U.S. regulatory takings cases and explanations of the special sacrifice theory in German law to reconstruct the review standards for determining special sacrifice in property rights in our country. These standards will examine individual cases based on economic harm, reasonable investment expectations, and government regulatory actions. However, the degree of harm suffered by landowners in different regions due to land reservations for public facilities varies, so a general rule could refer to German construction law and our legal system, setting a five-year reservation period as the general threshold for constituting a special sacrifice. Additionally, this article will discuss whether the compensation for reserved land in our country is adequate. After establishing the review standards for special sacrifice, another issue arises: how landowners can achieve compensation for special sacrifices. In other words, in the current situation where our country does not recognize citizens' ability to directly request compensation from the reserving agency on the grounds of special sacrifice, landowners can only obtain compensation through the land expropriation system. However, the Administrative Court has consistently held that, under the current requirements of the land expropriation system, landowners do not have the right to request expropriation from the approving authority (i.e., the Ministry of the Interior), as landowners are not entitled to be the subject of an expropriation request, and there is no statutory public law right for citizens to request expropriation. Thus, under the current system, unless the administrative agency actively expropriates the reserved land, citizens have almost no other means of actively seeking compensation. This article argues that many landowners hope to achieve special sacrifice compensation through land expropriation, given the completeness of the land expropriation system and the eventual realization of reserved land through expropriation. However, this line of thinking leads to the issue of special sacrifices during the reservation period being framed within the context of the land expropriation system, thereby limiting citizens' compensation claims within a specific framework. In other words, the Administrative Court mistakenly limits landowners' claims for special sacrifice to requesting expropriation from the agency, confusing the differences in level and purpose between "special sacrifice compensation" and the "land expropriation system." Moreover, according to the Administrative Court, landowners can only achieve special sacrifice compensation through a request for expropriation, which is not inherently prohibited but only lacks legal provisions. Nonetheless, the Administrative Court has repeatedly rejected citizens' requests for land expropriation on procedural grounds, reflecting a confusion between "how to compensate" and "whether to compensate" at different levels and denying citizens the right to actively seek compensation for special sacrifice through land expropriation.This article believes that the Administrative Court's insistence on "no law, no compensation" is inconsistent with the constitutional protection of property rights. However, following the Judicial Yuan's Interpretation No. 747, the Constitutional Court has confirmed that special sacrifice compensation is derived from constitutional mandates, breaking the notion of "no law, no compensation." Whether this will influence the Administrative Court's view that citizens may request compensation based on special sacrifice when land use restrictions occur remains a key focus of this article. In conclusion, the Administrative Court not only narrows the application of Interpretation No. 747 but also excludes its application based on special legal provisions, a view far removed from the special sacrifice theory's emphasis that "where there is sacrifice, there should be compensation." In the final section of this article, we will explore whether there is truly no limitation on the reservation period for facility land in our country. In other words, whether the public has any recourse to challenge the legality of urban plans that designate public facility reservation lands. In the past, due to the regulatory nature of urban planning, the public could not seek effective relief for non-concrete legal actions. Although some scholars argued that the courts could review regulations incidentally or that citizens could initiate declaratory or preventive injunction lawsuits, the limitations of these legal actions often left the public without effective relief. The Administrative Court has largely adopted a negative stance on this issue. However, after Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 742 and the new amendments to the Administrative Litigation Act concerning the review of urban plans, landowners of reserved lands have, for the first time, been given the opportunity to seek relief. The key issue then becomes how to assess the illegality of an urban plan and how to balance the freedom of urban planning formation with the limits of judicial review. Regarding the issue of reserved public facility lands, this article argues that if the reservation exceeds 25 years, it should be considered as a violation of higher-level regulations and planning guidelines. Furthermore, the imbalance between the benefits of the reservation and the sacrifices borne by the public renders the urban plan grossly illegal. The courts can declare the urban plan invalid in accordance with Article 237-28 of the Urban Planning Act. Once the urban plan that underpins the reservation of public facility land is declared invalid, the public should be able to request the relevant agency to promptly decommission or amend the illegal reservation of public facility land, thereby effectively safeguarding the property rights of citizens.