摘要
近年，公司股東名簿查閱權爭議在各大公司經營權爭奪戰或企業併購防衛戰中不斷被提出，我國主管機關也因此作出了數封函釋以為解釋。然而，股東名簿及其查閱制度於我國卻長期未受重視，對此部分之研究也相對稀少。甚有不少論述錯誤的將股東名簿誤認為與公司一般商業帳簿相提並論。此種論述原點，不外乎係出因於我國公司法第210條將股東名簿與公司帳簿作同一之規範，從而導致在這種一視同仁的規範模式下，股東名簿制度受到曲解。為此，本文從資訊權理論與股東名簿制度之歷史演進，追溯股東名簿制度的原貌，深入探究公司法的起源——英國公司法，如何對待股東名簿制度及股東名簿查閱制度的建置。 析言之，英國公司法根本不認為股東名簿具有與公司商業帳簿相等的隱密性。股東名簿之功能在於確定股東身份，本質上毫不具有隱密性資訊之性質，供外部人查閱對於公司營運也難以產生損害。並且在利用公司組織的情況下，由於股東本人得以隱藏在公司獨立的法人格背後，不但會使主管機關稽核變得困難，私人間交易秩序也難以維護。更有甚者，於金融自主化之現代，由於公司與社會上的投資者乃至於整體市場間複雜的交織，公司組織的監督已經不僅只是主管機關所能夠一肩擔負。相對於我國，英國早在18至19世紀便體會到公司組織的監督不可能交由主管機關一手實行，公眾審查作為監督之一環不可或缺，只有透過資訊的公開，使能夠確立健全的監督機制。而股東名簿供公眾查閱，便是最初階的監督機制，提供交易相對人與投資市場確認公司成員、賦予公司股東間相互聯繫之手段。 在具備此一認識下，本文首先從「資訊」的本質切入探討，並承接後文以提出「層級化資訊公開體系」之見解。其次，本文也從股東名簿制度歷史發展，探究股東名簿本身所持有的態貌，確認股東名簿僅僅只是記載公司成員聯絡資訊之書類，與一般商業帳簿之性質具有根本上的不同。而我國公司法除了在股東名簿相關規定上，欠缺一體性規範、國內見解混亂外；將股東名簿與商業帳簿等同視之之規範模式，更產生股東名簿制度遭惡意濫用之問題。是以，本文透過介紹英國公司法規範，歸納值得我國借鏡之具體事項，整理我國實行上所可能面臨的反對意見、並提出各該意見的應對措施。最後，綜合本文研究結果，提出幾項法制建議：層級化資訊公開體系的建置、公眾審查主義的引進，以及股東名簿查閱法制的再建構，以為將來立法、行政、司法與實務操作之參考。
並列摘要
In recent years, the right to inspect the shareholders’ roster disputes have been continuously raised in the contests for corporate control, or the mergers and acquisitions. Ministry of Economic Affairs has also made several administrative rules. However, the shareholders’ roster system and the right to inspect it have not received much attention in Taiwan for a long time, and research on this part is relatively rare. There are quite a few misconceptions that putting the company’s business books and the shareholders’ roster on the same basis. The origin of this discussion is nothing more than the standardization of the shareholders’ roster and the company’s books in Article 210 of the Company Act of Taiwan. As a result, the shareholders’ roster system is misinterpreted under this regulation mode. In this thesis, I intend to trace the nature of the shareholders’ roster system from information rights theory and the historical evolution of shareholders’ roster. This thesis will introduce how the origin of the company law - the United Kingdom company law, deal with the shareholders’ roster system and the inspection right of it. Specifically, the UK company law does not at all treat the shareholders’ roster has the same confidentiality as the company's business books. The function of the shareholder’s roster is to determine the identity of the shareholders. In essence, there is no hidden information. It is also difficult to cause damage to the company’s operation by only to inspecting it. Moreover, in the case of using the company’s organization, because the shareholders themselves can be hidden behind the company’s separate legal personality, it will not only make the audit of the Authorities more difficult, but also the order of private transactions is difficult to maintain. In more, due to the complex intertwining between the company and the social investors and the overall market, the supervision of the company organization is not what the Authorities can handle on its’ own. Compared with Taiwan, as early as the 18th and 19th centuries, the United Kingdom realized that the supervision of the company organization could not be carried out only by the Authorities. Public inspection was indispensable as one of the supervisions. Only through the disclosure of information, it was possible to establish a sound supervision mechanism. The shareholders’ roster (register of members) for public inspection is the initial way of supervision mechanism, providing the means by which the counterparty of the transaction and the investment market confirm the members of the company and give the company shareholders mutual contact. In this thesis, I will begin with a discussion of the nature of “information” and to present a “hierarchical information disclosure system”. Secondly, this thesis also explores the natureof the shareholders’ roster system from the historical development of it, confirming that the shareholders’ roster is only a book that records the contact information of the company members, which is fundamentally different from the nature of the general business books. In addition to the lack of comprehensive regulations and domestic insights into the shareholders’ roster, the Company Act of Taiwan equates the regulations of the shareholders’ roster and the general business books, causing the problem of malicious abuse of the shareholders’ roster system. Therefore, this thesis introduces the UK regulations, sums up the specific issues that are worthy of Taiwan’s borrowing, and sorts out the objections that may face in implementing the implementation, and proposes countermeasures for each of these opinions. Finally, based on the results of this thesis, I propose several legal proposals, such as the establishment of a hierarchical information disclosure system, the introduction of community review, and the re-construction of the legal system of shareholders roster, for legislative, administrative, judicial, and practical operations reference.
參考文獻
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
壹、中文文獻
尹章華、潘秀菊、馮震宇、陳連順（1999），《商事法入門》，臺北市：元照。
王文宇（2003），《公司法論》，臺北市：元照。
王文宇、林國全、曾宛如、王志誠、蔡英欣、汪信君（2013），《商事法》，6版，臺北市：元照。