重構股東會召集權之法制

Reconstructed System of The Right to Convene a Shareholders' Meeting

張智旼(Chih-Min Chang)

指導教授 ： 蔡英欣

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2023年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202302813

摘要

我國股東會召集權法制之問題主要為召集權主體過於多元與未賦予少數股東適當之召集股東會途徑兩個方面，首先過往實務見解對於少數股東召集股東會權利之功能理解與要件解釋不當，以致於股東難以自行召集股東會，捍衛自身權利或改選董事會成員，因此公司股東反而傾向透過監察人或獨立董事來召集股東會，以達成召集股東會之目的。另一方面，依我國現行公司法之規定，個別監察人享有單獨召集股東會之權限，在2023年5月證券交易法修正前，審計委員會中之獨立董事成員亦享有單獨召集股東會之權限，因此當公司發生經營權爭奪事件時，與不同利益陣營配合之監察人間、獨立董事間，個別單獨召集股東臨時會之情況並不罕見，甚至因此產生多重股東會之亂象。
為解決我國股東會召集權之亂象，本文以美國德拉瓦州公司法、美國模範公司法與日本公司法之規範為借鏡，上述法規有兩個方向值得我國參考，一是較為精簡之召集權主體設計，二是賦予少數股東適當召集權途徑之規定。最終，藉由外國法國與我國法之交互比較與借鑒，試圖對我國現行股東會召集權體系做出建議，建構出更加完善之規範，即是本文之研究方向。
針對我國股東會召集權法制所生之亂象，首先應解除對少數股東之股東會召集權的過多限制，並以少數股東自行召集股東會是否存有權利濫用之情事作為核心，建立審查之標準，賦予股東適當之途徑去捍衛自身權利、表達自身訴求。另一方面，應適度精簡化股東會之召集權主體，如監察人召集股東會之權利，應改由全體監察人共同行使，以避免監察人各自單獨召集股東會之亂象。最後，亦應建立預防股東會召集權重疊之配套措施，從事前之角度解決多重股東會之亂象。

關鍵字

股東會召集權 ； 少數股東 ； 監察人 ； 獨立董事 ； 多重股東會

並列摘要

There are two issues with the convening rights of shareholders' meetings in our country. First of all, there is a multitude of entities with the right to convene meetings, and secondly minority shareholders are not granted appropriate avenues to convene shareholders’ meetings. As a result, shareholders tend to rely on supervisors or independent directors to convene meetings in order to achieve their objectives.
On the other hand, under the current Company Law in our country, individual supervisors have the authority to convene meetings independently. Prior to the amendment of the Securities Exchange Act in May 2023, independent directors in the audit committee also had the power to convene meetings independently. Therefore, it is not uncommon for special shareholder meetings to be called separately by different factions of interests, resulting in a chaotic situation of multiple shareholder meetings.
To address the chaotic situation regarding convening of shareholders' meetings, this article examines the Delaware General Corporation Law, the Model Business Corporation Act, and the Companies Act of Japan for guidance. These regulations suggest two directions: streamlining the entities with convening rights and providing appropriate avenues for minority shareholders to convene meetings. Through comparative analysis, this article aims to recommend improvements and establish a comprehensive framework for convening shareholders' meetings in our country.
In dealing with the chaos on the right to convene shareholders' meetings in our country, the first step is to remove excessive restrictions on the convening rights of minority shareholders. And a standard should be established, focusing on whether there is a risk of shareholders abusing their rights, to determine whether to allow shareholders to convene special shareholders' meetings., it is important to provide shareholders with appropriate avenues to defend their rights and express their demands. On the other hand, it is necessary to streamline the entities with convening rights for shareholders' meetings. For example, the right of supervisors to convene shareholders' meetings should be exercised collectively by all supervisors to avoid the chaotic situation of individual supervisors calling meetings separately. Finally, preventive measures should be established to address the issue of overlapping convening rights, aiming to resolve the problem of multiple shareholder meetings from a proactive perspective.

並列關鍵字

the right to convene a shareholders' meeting ； minority shareholders ； supervisor ； independent director ； multiple shareholders' meetings

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