- 學位論文
營建業聯合承攬之投機與合作關係之研究—以賽局理論分析
Opportunism and Cooperation of Construction Joint Ventures - A Game Theoretic Analysis
摘要
營建業聯合承攬為營建業常用的工程組織模式之一，可達到凝聚多方資 源、分攤工程風險、提升承攬工程機會與規模經濟等目的，因此此類型專案通 常具有規模大、高金額的特性，當廠商間規模、管理系統、技術能力等具有差 異時，執行聯合承攬便會出現合作上的障礙，因為廠 商之間不僅具有合作關 係，亦具有潛在的競爭關係，然而彼此之間僅有簽訂合作協議書作為管理與互 信的基礎，各家廠商為追求自身利益最大化在合作與投機行為 (Opportunist behavior)之間存在兩難。此外，因為營建業聯合承攬具有單一目的性，與一般 性質之聯合承攬不同，無法透過多次合作累積彼此信任，使雙方聯合承攬關係 僅能透過企業間的信任維持，對參與專案之廠商來說，彼此的競合關係將會影 響到利潤，亦會影響整體專案的成功與否，因此分析合作廠商之間的投機與合 作關係為營建業聯合承攬的重大議題之一。 本研究以賽局理論作為分析基礎，探討廠商在營建業聯合承攬過程中投機 與合作關係。首先收集有關營建業聯合承攬與聯合承攬合作關係的現有文獻， 並探討廠商在聯合承攬中信任所扮演的角色，根據聯合承攬投機與合作關係中 的重要變數建立賽局理論模型，再透過廠商在承攬關係中所扮演的角色，分析 廠商在專案中的相互依存關係與廠商追求利益最大化時可能會採取的行動，設 立情境變數，依照聯合承攬專案類型與廠商性質作為判斷依據，最後將模型擴 充為有限與無限重複賽局，並根據賽局理論得出廠商可能採取的行動，提出營 建業聯合承攬投機與合作關係相關假說，以供後人驗證。
並列摘要
Joint venture is one of the commonly used organization modes in construction industry, which can achieve the purpose of consolidating each other’s resources, diversification of project risks, enhancing project contracting opportunities and economies of scale, etc. When there are differences in scale, management system, technical capabilities between joint venture partners, it will be somehow hard to cooperation with partners. Therefore, there are both cooperative and potential competitive relationship between joint venture partners because each partner tries to maximize its own interests through cooperation or opportunism behaviors. Otherwise, construction joint venture, unlike the general contract of the general nature, has a single purpose, so that partners can hardly accumulate mutual trust by frequent cooperation. Cooperation and opportunism behavior in joint venture will be related the profit and the outcome of the overall project. We focus at analyzing and discussing opportunism and cooperation relationship in construction joint venture. First, we review the existing literature on cooperation relationship of CJV and different types of trust in JV. Then, we setup a game theory model of opportunism and cooperation of construction joint venture and then setup the scenario variables, extend the model through finite repeated and infinite repeated game. Finally, we based on the aforementioned shows proposed the hypothesis .