摘要
什麼生活是好生活？許多哲學家對此問題提出主張，本文的目的是探討其中一種理論──幸福論。幸福論者將好生活稱為幸福，而對於幸福，幸福論者有三個主要宣稱：第一，幸福是人行動與選擇所追求的最終目的；第二，幸福蘊含著功能的良好發揮；第三，幸福與德行相關。本文將依序探討這三個宣稱。首先，筆者試圖為第一個宣稱辯護，並透過形式限制的說明來限縮幸福生活的可能選項。接著，筆者試圖為第二個宣稱辯護。幸福論者一般以功能論證來支持第二個宣稱，但功能論證飽受批評。跟隨著柯絲佳（Christine Korsgaard），筆者以亞里斯多德在形上學上對形式、質料的說明來釐清功能的意義，並藉此回應功能論證面臨的諸多反駁。最後，說明德行是幸福的必要條件，並論證學者是否同時相信德行是幸福的充分條件取決於對實用智慧的理解。
並列摘要
What kind of life counts as good life? Many philosophers have tried to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. This thesis aims to reflect on one of the prominent theories concerning this issue: Eudaimonism. Eudaimonists define good life as happiness, and make three claims about this very concept. First, happiness is the final end of action and decision. Second, happiness implies human fulfillment. Third, happiness is correlated with virtue. This thesis defends the three claims sequentially. First, I will defend the first claim from some criticisms, and explain the formal constraints that happy life should meet. Secondly, Eudaimonists presented the function argument to support the thesis. There are a lot of criticisms against this argument. Following Christine Korsgaard’s approach, I appeal to Aristotle’s account of form and matter to clarify the meaning of “function”, and respond the criticisms accordingly. At the end, I will strengthen the third claim by showing that virtue is a necessary condition of happiness, and further argue that whether philosophers take virtue to be the sufficient condition for happiness depends on our understanding of practical wisdom.