公投機制中的門檻制度會使選民投票率下降。為了解決公投投票率低的問題,有些國家會合併舉行公投與其他選舉來提升投票率,不過關於此作法能否提升投票率的證據仍相當稀少。過去的研究皆為自然實驗或準實驗,不是隨機對照試驗,也無法探討其他影響投票率的因素與合併投票的交互作用。本研究以實驗室實驗的方式,探討公投綁大選是否會提高投票率,並同時討論門檻的存在、政治立場相同的人數多寡對於投票率的影響,並以遊戲化語言進行實驗說明,使用 BDM (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak) 法為核心方式蒐集受試者的願付價格,以多元線性迴歸模型分析投票意願。實驗結果顯示,公投綁大選能有效提升選民投票率,且至少能增加公投或大選其中一場的投票率,不過,公投綁大選也降低了社會福利程度,使多數方選民的獲勝率降低;結果同時也顯示參加門檻確實會降低選民投票率、相對多數方選民的投票意願較少數方更高,但門檻只會降低相對少數方選民的投票意願,對相對多數方選民並無影響。
Participation quorum, a common quorum rule to justify representativeness in modern referenda, has been shown to discourage turnout rate. To offset the discouragement, concurrent elections are widely used in some democratic institutions to increase the turnout of a referendum. Although some research have estimated how the concurrent elections could increase turnout rate by natural experiments or quasi-experiments, few efforts have been devoted to randomized controlled trial, not to mention the effect of extraneous factors. In this study, we conduct a gamified laboratory experiment to verify the influence on turnout between two concurrent elections, or more specifically, between a general election (without quorum) and a referendum (with quorum). Our results confirm that concurrent elections promote turnout in at least one election but lower social welfare. We also observe that participation quorum only decreases the turnout for minority group instead of majority group.