公平交易法對於專利授權行為管制之研究-從高通案談起

The Regulation of Patent Licensing under Fair Trade Act - From the Case of Qualcomm

施雅薰(Ya-Hsun Shih)

Advisor ： 黃銘傑

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/科際整合法律學研究所/碩士(2018年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201800695

Abstracts

本文主要探討公平交易法下對於專利授權管制可能所需評估之元素。首先，本文先從上位概念出發，分別探討智財法與競爭法制度各自之功能與目的。其次，本文認為可以透過三道關卡，檢驗前述上位概念是否落實於專利授權管制之具體制度中。

第一道關卡為：公平法第45條，其界定公平法對於專利授權行為的管制界線。藉由採取綜合衡量標準，來實踐智財法與競爭法兩套制度皆為促進創新之共同目標。

於第二道關卡中，本文認為應以市場力量作為競爭法介入契約自由之先決條件。本文認為專利權、SEP之市場力量其實可能弱於想像，SEP之市場力量行使更受到重重限制，至少包括真實性、水平處、垂直處、動態競爭上、行使上之限制。本文並指出，在探討SEP所可能帶來對於標準實施者之「專利箝制(patent holdup)」危害之外，同時專利權人所面臨之「反向專利箝制(reverse holdup)」與「逆專利箝制(holdout)」威脅，亦似不應輕易被忽視。

於第三道關卡中，本文主張以合理原則作為檢視專利授權限制之合法性依據。並藉由比較許多國家對於以低市占率作為授權安全區的作法，反思我國未設置安全區可能帶來之執法不確定性風險。

最後，本文依前述三道關卡所探討之評估因素檢視受我國公平會所裁罰之高通案。

於公平法第45條之討論中，本文認為於公平會並未證明高通公司之專利授權行為是以損害他人為主要目的，可能未必與一般「權利濫用說」之要件相符，權利濫用之指控得否成立，還有疑義。

於市場力量之討論中，本文認為高市占率與擁有SEP似皆不足以證立高通公司擁有在相關市場上「排除競爭之能力」，因而質疑高通公司具有獨占地位之認定可能並不成立。

於合理原則之討論中，本文就三個被指控之行為，分別探討其合理性。

首先，於拒絕授權晶片競爭同業之行為中，本文討論「不告訴承諾」與「權利耗盡」之間之關係，認為高通公司似未有「拒絕授權」之行為、「權利耗盡」可能與高通公司之授權模式無關、「不告訴之承諾」可能需進一步考量其促進競爭效果、「樞紐設施理論」似乎可能不能完全適用於本案。

其次，於採取不簽署授權契約則不提供晶片之手段中，本文認為由於高通公司之專利可能遍及於整台手機系統上，而非僅及於晶片之中。高通公司要求所有可能侵權之手機業者須先簽署授權契約，解決侵權疑慮之後，再提供晶片給他們，此一行為，似應為專利權人正當行使權利之合理行為，而無反競爭之疑慮。

最後，與特定事業簽署含有排他性之獨家交易折讓條款之行為中，本文認為公平會應先判斷實質性之封鎖效應，再評估忠誠折扣促進競爭之面向，得到淨競爭效果，方才能評量系爭行為之違法性。本文認為，或許似亦可參考近來歐盟法院與執委會所採取之「同等效率競爭者」標準，以增加論據之客觀性與說服力。

Keywords

競爭法 ； 專利授權 ； 市場力量 ； 標準必要專利 ； 合理原則 ； 權利耗盡 ； 忠誠折扣

Parallel abstracts

This thesis mainly discusses the factors that may need to be evaluated for the regulation of patent licensing under Fair Trade Act.

Firstly, this thesis discusses superordinate concept about the respective functions and purposes of intellectual property law and competition law system respectively.

Secondly, it is considered that it may be possible to test whether the above superordinate concept could be implemented in the specific system of the regulation of patent licensing through three checkpoints.

The first of the three checkpoints is Article 45 of Fair Trade Act, which defines the regulatory boundaries of Fair Trade Act in relation to patent licensing. By adopting comprehensive measures standard, it is believed that the common purpose of promoting innovation for both intellectual property law and competition law systems could be served.

In the second checkpoints, this thesis argues that market forces should be used as a prerequisite for the competition law to intervene in the freedom of contract. It is considered that market power of patent rights or SEP might in fact be weaker than imagined. And the exercise of market power of SEP might be subject to numerous restrictions, including at least authenticity, horizontal, vertical, dynamic competition, and enforcement restrictions. It is also pointed out that, in addition to exploring the potential harm of "patent holdup " to standard implementers, the threats of "reverse holdup" and "holdout" faced by patent holders should also not be overlooked.

In the third checkpoint, this thesis holds that rule of reason should be taken as the basis for examining the legality of patent licensing restriction. Besides, compared with foreign countries, which take low market shares as the licensing Safety Zone, failing to set up Safety Zone in our country might bring uncertainty risk of law enforcement.

Finally, this thesis examines Qualcomm punishment decision made by Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) according to the assessment factors discussed in the above three checkpoints.

In the discussion of Article 45 of Fair Trade Act, this thesis holds that TFTC has not proved that Qualcomm's patent licensing practices server for the main purpose of harming others, and thus may not be consistent with the requirements of "abuse of rights theory". It is doubtful whether the allegation of abuse of rights could be established.

In the discussion of market forces, this thesis argues that neither the high market shares nor the holding of SEP seems to be sufficient to prove that Qualcomm has the "ability to exclude competition" in the relevant market, and therefore questions the assertion that Qualcomm has a dominant position.

In the discussion of rule of reason principles, this thesis discusses the reasonableness of the three alleged acts, respectively.

First, for the allegation of refusal to licensing competitors, this thesis discusses the relationship between "covenant not to sue" and "doctrine of patent exhaustion", and considers that Qualcomm's licensing practice might not be seemed as equivalent to “refusal to licensing,” and "doctrine of patent exhaustion" may be irrelevant to Qualcomm's licensing model, and pro-competitive effect of the "covenant not to sue" practice might need to be further considered. It is also pointed that the “essential facilities doctrine” seems unlikely to apply entirely to this case.

Secondly, for the no license no chip allegation, this thesis argues that Qualcomm's patents might be spread over the entire mobile phone system, rather than only covering the chip. Qualcomm requires all potential infringing mobile phone companies to sign license agreement to resolve infringement concerns before providing the chip to them. This act might be a legitimate exercise of the rights of the patentee without anti-competitive concerns.

Finally, for the allegation of exclusive rebates dealing with specific undertaking, this thesis argues that TFTC should first evaluate the substantial foreclosure effect, then assess the pro-competitive aspects of loyalty rebates. While obtaining a net competitive effect, the assessment of the illegality of the alleged conduct might be reasonable. It is suggested the criterion of "As Efficient Competitor Test" adopted recently by the European Court of Justice and European Commission might serve as a reference for TFTC to increase the objectivity and persuasiveness of its argument.

Parallel keywords

Competition Law ； Patent Licensing ； Market Power ； SEP ； Rule of Reason ； Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion ； Loyalty Rebates

References

9. 陳聰富（2009），《專利契約》，台北：經濟部智慧財產局。

13. 黃章典（2015），《專利授權實務》，三版，台北：經濟部智慧財產局。

22. 劉孔中（2009），《智慧財產權運用與競爭秩序》，三版，台北：經濟部智慧財產局。

9. 何曜任（2011），〈美國法專利權濫用理論對我國法之啟示〉，《政大智慧財產評論》，9卷2期。

21. 黃銘傑（1998），〈中小企業保護與競爭政策-憲法增修 “中小企業保障條款” 的問題提起〉，《 臺大法學論叢》，27卷3期。