- 學位論文
2016年公職人員選舉罷免法修正前後罷免制度之研究
A Study of the Recall System Before and After the Amendment of the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act in 2016
摘要
1994年因核四案預算爭議，國民黨修正公職人員選舉罷免法（下稱選罷法）大幅調升罷免門檻，避免其黨籍立委被罷免，此後二十餘年沒有罷免案能通過；2016年民進黨執政後，順應民意修正選罷法以大幅調降罷免門檻，此後掀起了一股罷免熱潮。綜觀我國的罷免制度史，2016年修法後至今的這波罷免潮最為狂熱，這樣的現象究竟是如何造成的？現行的罷免門檻是否真的太低？未來罷免制度應如何修正？成為了筆者研究罷免制度的動機與目的。 關於現行的罷免制度，多數說認為在單一選區有「少數罷免多數」違反民主多數決的疑慮；而在複數選區（單記非讓渡投票制）則有「多數罷凌少數」違反其保障少數代表精神的疑慮，另外是否應允許罷免立法委員則一直存在爭議。本研究透過第二章文獻回顧、第三章其他國家罷免制度（瑞士、美國、日本及英國）及第四章深度訪談（選委會官員、立法委員、學者、罷免案相關人員）所得資料，對現行罷免制度進行全面性的檢討，尋求前開問題的解答。最後於第五章提出結論與建議如下： 一、現階段並無規範罷免理由的必要。 二、關於單一選區各級行政首長的罷免制度，建議第一階段提議門檻維持選舉人總數的1%；第二階段連署門檻根據該選區選舉人總數的多寡調整為10%至15%；第三階段通過門檻則調升至同意票數達原選區選舉人總數的30%至35%之間，且同意票必須多於不同意票。 三、關於複數選區地方民意代表的罷免制度，建議現階段可考慮維持現行的罷免制度，嗣往後若累積更多的罷免實例，再行檢討是否有廢止或調整的必要。 四、關於立法委員的罷免制度，理想上應予以廢止；若現實上難以廢止，則門檻應比照單一選區各級行政首長的部分一併調升。 五、我國不適合引進美國那套罷免與補選合併舉行的制度，但建議修法將應辦理補選的期間從三個月延長至半年或以上。 六、我國現階段不適合引進瑞士及日本那套允許民眾提起解散地方議會的制度。 最後，本研究認為罷免制度沒有所謂正確的形式，例如是否允許罷免立法委員只是一個政策的選擇，沒有所謂的對錯。換句話說，這些選擇將會型塑我們會有什麼樣的罷免制度。比起去找出罷免制度的理想形式，更重要的應該是要想辦法去形成一些政治或文化規範，使政黨、政治人物、公民團體及民眾等，各自在內心中都有一套標準，知道去衡量在什麼樣的情況下使用罷免制度是具備正當性的，讓罷免制度可以真正成為例外的防弊工具，而不是經常被有心人士濫用的工具，這是我們的理想。
並列摘要
In 1994, due to the controversy over the budget of the Nuclear Power Plant No.4 case, the Kuomintang amended the “Civil Servants Election and Recall Act” and significantly raised the threshold for recall to prevent its legislators from being removed from legislative yuan. After the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2016, it responded to public opinion by amending the “Civil Servants Election and Recall Act” and lowering the threshold for recall, which led to a wave of recall. Looking at the history of the recall system in Taiwan, the wave of recall since the 2016 amendment has been the most frenzied. What is the cause of this phenomenon? Is the current threshold for recall really too low? How should the recall system be amended in the future? This has become the motivation and purpose of the research on the recall system. Regarding the current recall system, most people say that in a Single-Member District (SMD), there is a concern that "the minority recall the majority" violates the majoritarian democracy, while in Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), there is a concern that "the majority bully the minority" violates the spirit of SNTV of protecting the representatives of the minority. This study conducts a comprehensive review of the current recall system through a literature review in Chapter 2, a review of recall systems in other countries (Switzerland, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom) in Chapter 3, and in-depth interviews (with EC officials, legislators, academics, and recall case stakeholders) in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, this study will present the conclusions and recommendations as follows: 1.At this stage, there is no need to regulate the grounds for recall. 2.For the recall system of the chief executive of a SMD, it is proposed that the threshold for the first stage proposal remain at 1% of the total electors; the threshold for the second stage to lunch a petition adjusted to 10% to 15% according to the number of electors in the original electoral district; the threshold for the third stage to adopt the recall raise to 30% to 35% of the number of consenters reached the total electors in the original electoral district, and among the valid ballots for recall, where the number of consenters is more than that of dissenters. 3.For the recall system of the local elected representatives of SNTV, we can consider maintaining the current recall system at this stage, and then review whether there is a need to abolish or adjust it if more cases of recall are accumulated in the future. 4.The recall system of legislative members should ideally be abolished; if it is difficult to abolish, the threshold should be raised in line with the part of the executive head of a SMD at all levels. 5.It is not suitable for our country to introduce the system of the United States where the recall and by-election are held together, but it is proposed to amend the law to extend the period when a by-election should be held from three months to six months or more. 6.At this stage, it is not suitable to introduce the system of Switzerland and Japan that allows the public to initiate the dissolution of local councils. Finally, this study concluded that there is no so-called right form of the recall system, for example, whether or not to allow the recall of legislators is just a policy choice. In other words, these choices will shape the kind of recall system we will have. More important than finding the ideal form of a recall system, is finding ways to develop political or cultural norms so that political parties, politicians, civic groups, and the public have a standard in their minds to measure the legitimacy of the recall system under the circumstances, so that the recall system can truly be an exceptional tool to prevent corruptions, rather than a tool to be abused by those who wish to do so. This is our ideal.