- 學位論文
我國政府對泛公股銀行的所有與監管——以政策授信為例
Government Ownership and Regulation of State-Owned Banks in Taiwan—Take Policy Credit Extension as an Example
摘要
我國過去以公營銀行為主，即便民營化並經數次金融改革，財政部作為公股股權管理機關，仍持有泛公股銀行一定比例股份並多握有過半董監事席次，即俗稱「八大行庫」的泛公股銀行。同時，以金管會為中心之銀行監理者與財政部同隸屬於行政院之下，而產生政府身兼泛公股銀行之所有人及監理者的利害衝突。再者，泛公股銀行之弊案頻傳，尤以政策授信為大宗，然使泛公股銀行配合政策之政府股東卻未因此負擔相應責任。我國又存在諸多政府或政府股東相關之特殊法規，易使政府脫免責任而生權責不符的疑慮，不利泛公股銀行其他股東及整體金融市場之發展。 本文爬梳整理我國相關案例及法規，並參酌德國、美國及國際組織如何處理政府與銀行的關係後，認為應避免政府直接介入金融體系。在政府股東行為屬私法行為的前提下，其應作為單純財務投資人。此外，政府既同時身為泛公股銀行之所有人與監理者，本文區分泛公股銀行的治理面向及監理面向分別給予建議，俾免不當政治力介入。 治理方面，近程我國應調整對政府之優惠性規定並加強政府股東的究責機制，包含修正公股股權管理要點、公股代表派任要點、引入書面揭露指令、及其他優惠性規定。遠程為使政府股東以間接方式介入泛公股銀行，我國應提高泛公股銀行自然人董事之比例，或甚至全面刪除法人代表制。監理方面，本文觀察相關案例及裁罰案，金管會雖身為泛公股銀行主要監理機關，卻似未積極行使其監理權限。為落實金管會事前行政干預，或應重新檢視銀行法關於利害關係人之認定，並使金管會事前專案核准政策授信。事後究責機制則以金管會中心，輔以檢察機關監理泛公股銀行。藉由上述機制之共同作用期待得以排除政府於泛公股銀行的利害衝突，使金融體系得以穩定。
並列摘要
In the past, State-Owned Banks (hereinafter “SOBs”) were the mainstay in Taiwan. Even though they were privatized and underwent several financial reforms, the Ministry of Finance, as government-owned share management agency, still holds a relatively large portion of shares and controls more than half of the board of directors in SOBs. At the same time, the Financial Supervisory Committee (hereinafter “FSC”), which is also under the Executive Yuan as the Ministry of Finance, is the main regulator of banks in Taiwan. Thus, the government’s dual role as a regulator as well as a shareholder raises the issue of conflict of interest in SOBs. Moreover, malfeasance of SOBs, especially policy credit extensions often occurs without the government shareholder bearing its corresponding responsibility. Taiwanese legislations oftentimes grant preferential treatments to the government or the government shareholder, therefore opening up loopholes for the government to evade its liability and impede the development of the financial market. In analyzing the relevant cases and regulations in Taiwan and taking reference from how Germany, the U.S., and international organizations deal with the relationship between the government and the banking system, this thesis believes that the government shall refrain from directly intervening in the financial system. Under the premise that conducts of the government shareholder is of private law issue, the thesis holds that a government shareholder should only play the role of a financial investor. Furthermore, since the government plays a dual role as the main shareholder and the regulator of SOBs, the thesis proposes several suggestions to prevent improper political intervention. In terms of the government shareholder, preferential regulations should be adjusted and the responsibility of the government shareholder should be strengthened, i.e., amending the Key Points of the Management and Disposal of Government-Owned Shareholding, the Key Points of Representatives of Government-Owned Shareholding, and other preferential provisions, introducing the written instruction disclosure mechanism. In order for the government shareholder to be involved in SOBs indirectly, Taiwan should increase the portion of natural person directors in SOBs or even remove the representative system completely. In terms of the regulator, this thesis observes that the FSC seemingly has not exercised its authority actively towards SOBs. To implement the prior supervisory mechanism of the FSC, it is necessary to revisit the definition of interested party in the Banking Law and introduce the prior approval mechanism of FSC to policy credit extensions. In addition, the FSC and the prosecutor could cooperate to regulate SOBs. Through this set of suggestions, it is expected that the conflict of interests of the government in SOBs could be eliminated, and the stability of the financial system could be maintained.