- 學位論文
從FTC訴高通案談標準必要專利權的行使—以FRAND授權及關鍵設施理論為中心
Rethinking Standard Essential Patent in Light of FTC v. Qualcomm–Focusing on FRAND Agreements and Essential Facility Doctrine
摘要
美商高通公司在行動通訊產業佔有舉足輕重之地位，其獨創的標準必要專利授權模式是否合法在各國實務及學術界引起重大討論，並牽動通訊產業及商業政策的發展。2020 年 8 月 11 日，美國聯邦第九巡迴上訴法院推翻了地方法院關於高通拒絕授權標準必要專利違法的判決，認定高通拒絕授權行為未違反競爭法，並批評地方法院的大部分分析與公認的法律標準背道而馳。這兩上下級法院的判決是兩極化的，其中被廣為討論的問題之一即為標準必要專利拒絕授權行為下的競爭法分析。本文就行動通訊產業、標準必要專利、高通案及競爭法作介紹，並以高通拒絕授權行為貫穿本文，探討該行為在競爭法及標準必要專利制度下的意義。有鑑於美國上下級法院就拒絕授權是否具反競爭性的分析未有共識，本文提供以關鍵設施理論分析拒絕授權之方法，並借鏡美國及歐盟法院相關判決，解釋適用關鍵設施理論的利弊，並嘗試提出兼顧專利制度意旨及市場公平競爭的分析。另外，本文亦從FRAND 的角度探討拒絕授權行為的違法性，並從標準制定組織的智慧財產權政策及經濟學視角分析技術標準制度下授權對象的限制及拒絕授權的影響。
並列摘要
Qualcomm Incorporated plays a critical role in the telecommunications industry, its standard-essential patent licensing model is legal or not has aroused discussions in various countries and may affect the development of the telecommunications industry and commercial policies. On August 11, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's decision that Qualcomm's refusal to license standard essential patents violated competition law, found that Qualcomm's refusal to license did not violate antitrust law, and criticized district court's analysis. The judgments of two courts are polarized, and one of the widely discussed issue is the analysis of competition law under the refusal of licensing standard essential patents. This article introduces the telecommunications industry, standard essential patents, the Qualcomm case and competition law, and runs through this article with the refusal of licensing standard essential patents by Qualcomm to discuss the significance of this behavior under competition law. In view of the fact that there is no consensus on whether the refusal of licensing is anti-competitive in the U.S. courts, this artice provides Essential Facility Doctrine to analyze the refusal of licensing. Using the doctrine does not only take the purpose of statute of the patent law in to account, but also give consideration to fair trade market. In addition, this article also discusses the illegality of refusal to license from the perspective of FRAND and analyzes the limitation of implementer and the impact of refusal to license under intellectual property policy and the field of economics.