- 學位論文
甚麽是親中？中國－馬來西亞關係近況發展的6M分析（2013年－2018年）
Defining Pro-China: The 6M Analysis of the Development of China-Malaysian Relations (2013 – 2018)
摘要
2013年至2018年之間，中國與馬來西亞之關係可謂是達到了新高點。在此期間，中馬兩國在許多面向展開合作關係，包括軍事、經貿、教育及文化等等。雙方的合作關係甚至成為了馬來西亞2018年全國選舉的重點議題之一，當時執政者以首相納吉．拉薩（Najib Razak）為首，其發起或支持的許多中馬合作工程案備受質疑，被批評是「親中」的表現。其中一個大力批評納吉親中的群體為希望聯盟（Pakatan Harapan），而他們於2018年全國選舉中的勝利無意間也被刻畫成「反中派」的勝利。整起事件的過程中，「親中」的使用似乎是貶義用途。2019年「反對逃犯條例修訂草案運動」開始時，馬來西亞普遍華裔也高度關注此事，而「親中」與「反中」逐漸成為了嘲諷意味極重的政治標籤。馬來西亞在2013年至2018年之間與中國的互動關係似乎也被貼上了一樣的標籤。 甚麼是親中？本研究認為目前「親中」作為形容詞的用法帶有犧牲自主權，並妥協自身立場的含意。中馬關係中是否真的有如此現象？現今有關兩國互動關係的理論架構，主要以「遠近」為衡量單位，或是以國對國之反應來判斷其關係之本質，如：新現實主義中的「抗衡」（Balancing）、「扈從」（Bandwagoning）或「避險」（Hedging）。然而，由此角度並未能充分解釋「親中」，因為這些理論主要以國家行為者（state as actor）為衡量基準，缺乏了深入到社會層級互動之考量。國家行為者制定決策的考量主要以可衡量之客觀元素，如：國家之硬實力（Hard power），但「親中」的表現似乎有意忽略此元素，以「偏好」（preference）作為制定決策之基本考量，社會行動者（societal actor）也因此是探討「親中」之定義重要的研究對象。本研究嘗試以Andrew Moravscik所提出的自由主義理論架構，結合Chia-Chien Chang及Alan H. Yang所提出的6M分析法，對中馬在2013年至2018年之間的互動過程進行分析，並以此探討「親中」之定義。 馬國社會中第二大族群就是具有「中華情結」之華裔群體，馬國的「親中」表現極有可能由此開始。但本研究發現馬國「親中」的表現除了源自於華裔社會行動者，也可能從處在執政層級之巫裔社會行動者。本研究以6M分析法歸納出2013年至2018年之間重要的「親中」事件，並總結出兩大「親中化」過程，即「由上至下」（國家行為者至社會行動者）以及「由下至上」（社會行動者至國家行為者）。
並列摘要
China-Malaysian relations have reached new heights between 2013 and 2018 with numerous cooperation among the two nations in terms of military, trade, education and culture. Such developments have even garnered much attention during Malaysia’s 2018 General Elections, as the government led by Najib Razak has either supported or initiated plentiful projects with Chinese investments or collaboration between the two. The opposition parties, mainly Pakatan Harapan, were one of the more outspoken critics of said projects and when they achieved victory in the 2018 General Elections, it coincidentally appeared as if an “anti-China” faction has won. Throughout this period, “Pro-China” has been utilized more as a negative term. This is evident as well during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, as most of the Malaysian-Chinese were concerned with the developments of the movement, and began to employ “Pro/Anti-China” labels on opposing opinionators. It appears that the China-Malaysian relations from 2013 to 2018 were labeled similarly. However, what is “Pro-China”? This terminology is mostly used to describe a compromised position towards China, but can we observe such a phenomenon in the China-Malaysian relations? The relationship between states is usually evaluated in terms of their structural distances and/or the reaction they have towards each other, as how Neorealism has emphasized balancing, bandwagoning or hedging. Nevertheless, the academic view is unable to provide a compelling explanation for the term “Pro-China”, since these IR theories view the state as the actor, and lack the consideration of the interaction between states at the societal level. The state as the actor will make its decision based on objective considerations like hard power, but the term “Pro-China” seems to suggest an abandonment of said considerations and utilize a preference-based decision-making process. This implies the importance of taking the “societal actors” into consideration to better define “Pro-China”. This research combines the Liberal Theory provided by Andrew Moravscik and the 6M analytical tool conceived by Chia-Chien Chang and Alan H. Yang to scrutinize the interaction between China and Malaysia from 2013 to 2018 and attempt to define “Pro-China”. Malaysia being “Pro-China” might have its origin in its second-largest ethnic group: Chinese, as they usually hold a special view on China (中華情結). However, this research has also observed ranks among the Malay rulers/politicians being a significant contributor to Malaysia being “Pro-China”. The following article shall provide a list of vital factors between 2013 and 2018 that contributes to Malaysia becoming “Pro-China” and explain how the process is primarily divided into two modes: Top-Bottom (State as the actor to Societal actors) and Bottom-Up (Societal actors to the state).