本研究探討債務契約對借款公司投資政策的影響。我使用 2001 年至 2016 年 之樣本進行實證研究,並將債務契約分成績效型與資本型債務契約。研究結果顯 示資本型債務契約與借款公司的資本支出和創新效率呈現顯著的正相關。額外測 試中,流動性限制的債務契約在投資活動中扮演重要的角色。資本型債務契約相 較於績效型債務契約較不會抑制公司的投資機會,借款公司可能會過度投資於資 本支出。此外,當董事持股較多,資本型債務契約導致較佳的創新效率。另外, 雖然財務受限制的公司擁有較多的債務契約,但不損及其創新效率;相反的,更 能改善其創新效率。而聯貸案中包含越多外國銀行,該借款公司擁有較佳的創新 效率。最後我發現資本支出與創新效率導致較好的公司績效。總結,藉由提供債 務契約影響公司投資程度的進一步見解,本研究不論是對借款公司或是聯貸銀行 皆有一定的影響力。
This study investigates whether loan covenants influence borrowers’ investment policy. I use the sample of syndicated loans in Taiwan over the period of 2001 to 2016 and classify covenants into two categories: performance covenants and capital covenants. The empirical results present that capital covenants have a positive and significant association with capital expenditures and innovation efficiency. Additional test indicates that the restriction of current ratio plays a crucial role in borrowers’ investment policy. Relative to performance covenants, capital covenants are less likely to inhibit corporate investment opportunities. Hence, capital covenants restrictions may cause firms to over-invest in capital expenditures Besides, capital covenants are associated with better innovation efficiency when directors of board have more share-ownership. Although financially constrained firms face more loan covenants, I find that this does not impair their innovation capability. Instead, financially constrained firms with greater covenants improve innovation efficiency. Loans with more foreign banks have better innovation efficiency. Finally, I find that innovation efficiency and capital expenditures are associated with better firm performance. In conclusion, the finding of this study is valuable to lenders and borrowers by providing further insights into the extent to which loan covenants influence corporate investments.