摘要
過去藉由傳統實證研究方法所獲得審計訂價之研究結論雖然已經是多如牛毛，然而這些結果仍未能完整地說明審計公費之決定因素與因素間之相互影響程度如何。本研究之第一部份在於檢視恩龍(Enron)事件是否且如何影響審計訂價之行為，藉由美國審計市場分別調查事件前(2000與2001年)後(2002至2006年)影響審計訂價之因素。研究結果顯示：在恩龍事件之後，當委託人歷經財務報表重編後，審計人員會要求較高訴訟可能之風險貼水(risk premium)。此外，本研究亦發現，恩龍事件後不僅是普遍之審計公費求索提高，既存之四大會計師事務所也會要求較恩龍事件前更高之風險貼水。再者，研究期間所涵蓋之Arthur Andersen客戶，由於Arthur Andersen之崩解，這些客戶在2002年被迫必須移轉到其他會計師事務所簽證，因此，初次委任減價(fee-cutting)現象之理論可藉由此次恩龍事件得到驗證。研究結果發現，就既存四大會計師事務所之客戶加以驗證，在其他條件不變下，過去為Arthur Andersen之客戶其審計公費減價程度相較於非Arthur Andersen客戶高。研究中也發現，審計訂價之結構性改變並非為單期或是一時之法令遵循，審計人員之訂價習性改變會因為此恩龍事件至少持續到第四年。本論文第一部份最後也針對非審計服務與審計專家進行檢視。研究中發現過去為Arthur Andersen之客戶會需要既存之四大會計師事務所提供更多非審計服務，並且願意支付比恩龍案件前更高之審計公費；其次，在恩龍案件後，當委託人屬於規模較大之公司時，會願意支付產業之專家貼水。 本研究第二部份檢視在財務報表重編之情況下，審計公費與可容忍誤述之關聯性分析。首先，研究中假設，委託人之盈餘管理習性會引起審計人員訴訟風險之變異，由於審計公費之減少(增加)與事後重編盈餘遞增(遞減)之程度息息相關，並且充分反應出審計人員以及(或是)證管會(Securities and Exchange Commission; SEC)對於委託人所列報盈餘之最大可容忍誤述。其次，財務報表重編之申請係由於先前呈送給證管會之財務報表產生錯誤敘述，有可能引起財務報表使用者在決策使用上產生錯誤。一般而言，財務報表重編之類型包括政府或是法規制定者之強制性重編，以及委託人之自願性重編二種。本研究中假設，審計人員當面對到財務報表有強制性重編時會要求比自願性重編更高之審計公費。再者，本研究如Abbott et al. (2006)之研究設計，假設委託人處於高成長(或高營運風險)情況下，其遞增之盈餘(營收)管理數額與審計公費呈正相關變動。本研究設計之樣本是取自於北美非管制之已審訂公開公司(North American non-regulated audited public companies)，其資料是來自於Audit Analytics以及Standard & Poor’s Compustat Research Insight資料庫2001年至2006年之審計公費與財務資訊。研究結果顯示，可容忍誤述程度(藉由裁決性應計項目與財務報表重編數額之差異數加以估計)與審計公費呈現負向關係。研究中亦指出，當財務報表強制重編時，審計人員將會索取較高之審計公費；同時，當委託人處於高本益比(price-earnings ratio)之成長型公司或公司之營運風險偏高時，其盈餘(營收)管理之數額與審計公費具有顯著之正向效果。
並列摘要
Audit pricing research has always been approached from the traditional positivist research methodology which yields results that may not give a full account of what determines and influences audit fees. The first essay examines whether and how the Enron affair affected audit fees by investigating the sample before (years 2000 and 2001) and after (years 2002 to 2006) the occurrence of this prominent event in the US audit market. The result shows that, on average, auditors ask for a higher litigation risk premium after the Enron affair if the client has experience a financial restatement. In addition, on average, audit fees have not only increased but that the fee premiums of the remaining Big 4 audit firms are also higher post-Enron. The fee-cutting phenomenon in an initial engagement is still applicable for former Arthur Andersen clients, who had to switch to a new auditor in the year 2002. However, among the clients of Big 4 auditors, the degree of fee-cutting is statistically greater for former Arthur Andersen’s clients as compared to those for non-former Arthur Andersen’s clients, ceteris paribus. The changed structure of audit pricing is not just a one shot reaction by the audit industry, but has lasted to the fourth year. Furthermore, I find that former Arthur Andersen clients require non-audit services in addition to audit service from remaining Big 4 auditor and pay higher audit fees than pre-Enron; and post-Enron, the result shows that when the client is a big company there is evidence of higher fees for Big 4 industry specialists relative to non-specialist auditors. The second essay examines the association between audit fees and tolerable misstatement under the circumstances where financial statements were restated. I first hypothesize that, due to the litigation risk was induced by client’s earnings management behavior, the scenario of audit fees decrease (increase) with ex post restated earnings increasing (decreasing) extent of earnings management reflecting the maximum tolerable misstatement by auditor and/or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Second, the filing of restated financial statement due to errors in the statement previously submitted to the SEC including enforcement by regulators and client’s voluntary releases. I also hypothesize that the enforced restatements are more associated with higher audit fees than voluntary releases. As Abbott et al. (2006), I hypothesize that the positive relation between increasing earnings (revenues) management amount and audit fees is heightened for clients that are high-growth (high operating risk) firms. I test my hypotheses with a sample of North American non-regulated audited public companies. My data are obtained from the Audit Analytics and Standard & Poor’s Compustat Research Insight databases from 2001 to 2006. I find that the extent of tolerable misstatements, as estimated by the difference between absolute value of discretionary accruals and restated amount, is negatively associated with audit fees. I also document that financial restatements that were enforced by regulators are associated with higher audit fees, and the interaction of amount of earnings management with price-earnings ratios and operating risk has a significant positive effect on audit fees.
參考文獻
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peter. 2006. Earnings management, litigation risk, and asymmetric audit fee responses. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (1): 85-98.
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Asthana, S., and J. Krishnan. 2006. Factors associated with the early adoption of the SEC’s revised auditor fee disclosure rules. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (2): 41-51.