- 學位論文
從代理觀點初探虛驚事件提報機制
Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
摘要
管理虛驚事件具有先期控制風險之優勢，然揭露自身或他人作業中，潛在『不安全行為』及『不安全狀態』之失誤資訊，其本質即存在道德風險之議題。本研究目的在探討企業與員工間於道德風險下，員工對虛驚事件之提報行為及企業激勵制度之設計方式。研究方法使用企業治理理論中之代理理論作為分析基礎，建立一『委託-代理』模型，應用數學之推導，使企業於期望效用最大化情況下，如何憑藉提報件數而決定激勵報酬支付方式。模型推論及結果顯示：（1）信息對稱下激勵報酬為固定值；（2）信息不對稱下，最適激勵報酬支付原則，可先視觀察之提報件數決定；（3）員工提報成本差距愈大，所獲激勵報酬差距也要愈大；（4）當企業愈無法從提報件數，猜測員工對虛驚事件辨識程度時，則企業激勵報酬之成本將增加；（5）若員工愈有欺騙誘因時，則企業應於低提報件數時，給予更低之報酬甚至為零。研究結論及管理建議：（1）企業可定期舉辦在職訓練以維持虛驚事件之提報品質；（2）為支付具誘因之激勵報酬，企業須全面評估員工的提報成本；（3）獨立成立作業稽查及事件審核單位，避免關鍵資訊流失；（4）定期追蹤事件提報件數趨勢，以確保激勵報酬制度的合理運作。
並列摘要
Near miss management has the advantage of control risk in advance. However there exists the nature of the moral hazard debate in the work to disclose the failure information of "unsafe acts" and "unsafe condition" to themselves or others. This study aims to explore the reporting of near miss by employees and design approach of incentive system by the corporate while in the agent perspective. The research method uses in the analysis of agency theory as a basis for the establishment of a "Principal - Agent" model. Appling mathematics of the derivation, so that enterprises in the case of expected utility maximization, how to submit with the number and decided to incentive compensation payment . Inference model and the results showed that: (1) under symmetric information, incentive compensation payment is a fixed value; (2) under asymmetric information, the principle of optimal incentive compensation payment could be depended on the number of submitting ; (3) the larger of the gap the submitting cost to the staff, the greater of the gap of incentive compensation payment should be; (4) When the company can not distinguish the recognition level of the staff to near miss, the cost of incentive compensation payment will increase; (5) If there exists a lure of cheating to the employee, the enterprise should submit the number of low, even zero. The findings and management recommendations are: (1) companies can organize on job training regularly to maintain the submitting quality of near miss reporting; (2) ) for the payment of incentive compensation with incentives, companies should comprehensively evaluate the cost of the reporting by its staff; (3) companies should establish an independent investigation and evaluation department of near miss to avoid the loss of critical information; (4) regularly follow the trend of submitting to ensure reasonable operation of the incentive compensation system.