- 學位論文
以認知理論角度探討疏失責任
Reconsideration of Negligence Rule, from the View Point of Cognition Theory
摘要
在雙方都蒙受損害的消費糾紛中，會存在賣方業者同時也身為受害者的情況。賣方業者於法律上雖無明顯疏失，但買賣雙方都因對當事事件之實際情況不了解，而造成了自身與整體社會損害。因此，當事雙方都具有對事實真相進行有限認知(cognition)的動機，藉此來預防糾紛發生。本研究將認知受限（cognitive limited）模型，引入侵 權(tort)行為中的雙邊預防（bilateral precaution）激勵機制；期望藉由描述個體行為的認知模式，找出在外生因素影響下，當法律需要判定相對疏失責任（comparative negligence）歸屬比例時，法律權利配置應該要如何制定，才能達到對整體社會來說最有效率的狀態。在訴訟成本變動影響下，訴訟成本越大時，則法律制定應越趨向保護消費者。而當消費者與業者之間的認知成本差距越大，此時法律權利配置也應該在消費者立場上，給予較多的談判力量。
並列摘要
There are some consumption disputes that seller and buyer are victims at same time. Without the obvious negligence on the law, both parties might cause some damages on themselves and society as well due to the lack of understanding about their deal. Therefore, both parties have the motive to carry out more cautious cognition in order to prevent the dispute. Using cognitive limited model, we investigate the proper mechanism that provide the incentive for the buyer and seller to make more efficient precaution. Our result shows that consumer might need more bargaining power if the lawsuit cost is larger. The similar result prevails when the buyer’s cost of cognition is relatively high comparing to the cost of seller.