- 學位論文
在寄售與營收分享價格相依的機制下考慮需求與價格和空間相依之通路協調
Channel Coordination under Consignment and Price-Dependent Revenue-Sharing Mechanism with Price-Sensitive and Shelf-Space Demand
摘要
寄售與營收分享的合約方式目前普遍流行於電子商務網站中，亞馬遜(Amazon)和電子灣(eBay)的商業營運模式是個適當例子。然而，是否亞馬遜和電子灣的商業收費結構能夠使供應鏈通路達到協調呢？在電子商務的營運過程中，它是一個很重要的策略性問題，也是一個令人有趣之研究假設的議題。在此寄售與營收分享合約機制下，我們面對一個製造商和一位零售商的通路結構，採用Stackelberg之供應通路的決策制定模型。零售商是領導者，提供製造商一個營收分享的合約(收費結構)，指明零售商的分享比例(和上架費)，和製造商的相對營收分享部份。製造商(供應商)則選擇一個零售價格(和架位空間)做為反應決策。我們在集中型通路和面對分散型通路的合作與不合作的情況下，進行通路決策的均衡分析。 我們的研究顯示不合作的分散型通路利益的損失是顯著的，它也與製造商決定較高的零售價格，和零售商訂定較高的營收分享比例，呈現出一致相符的關係。特別地，通路利益損失的大小會隨著需求之價格彈性的增加而增加，但反而會隨著零售商之通路成本比值的增加而減少。換言之，若零售商之通路成本的比值愈小和(或)需求的價格彈性愈大時，合作的分散型通路將產生比不合作的分散型通路更多利益。除此之外，為了達到通路的完全協調，我們提出利用上架費的利益分享機制，以期在通路成員之中彼此致力於柏拉圖的改善。
並列摘要
Consignment-based revenue-sharing contract is prevalent in internet commerce, such as Amazon’s and eBay’s merchandising business models. Can Amazon’s or eBay’s fee structure coordinate the channel? It’s a critical strategic problem in e-commerce operations and an interesting research hypothesis as well. Under such a contract, we model the decision-making of a supply channel with one manufacturer and one retailer as a Stackelberg game. The retailer, acting as the leader, offers the manufacturer a revenue sharing contract (i.e., fee structure), which specifies the percentage allocation of revenue (and slotting allowance) between herself and the manufacturer. The manufacturer (vendor) chooses a retail price (and number of shelf space) as a response. We conduct equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized channel settings with and without cooperation. Our study reveals that the profit loss due to non-cooperative decentralization is significant, and it tends to have a consistent bias, i.e., setting higher retail price by the manufacturer and higher revenue-sharing percentage by the retailer. Notably, the loss is increasing in the price elasticity of demand and decreasing in the retailer’s cost-share. In other words, the cooperative decentralization will generate more profit than that of the non-cooperative if the retailer’s cost-share is small and/or the elasticity is high. In addition, a profit-sharing scheme through slotting allowance is proposed to achieve perfect coordination, which leads to Pareto improvements among channel participants.