摘要
這篇論文討論道德責任（moral responsibility）與決定論（determinism）的相容性（compatibility），並將重點放在不相容論者（incompatibilist）提出的操弄論證（manipulation argument）上。 本文首先介紹各種相容論以及它們的困難。接著，介紹文獻上出現的各種操弄論證，以及相容論者的回應。市面上的相容論者對於操弄論證的回應大致上可分為軟線回應（soft-line response）和硬線回應（hard-line response），我將說明為何我認為這兩種路徑在目前都缺乏令人滿意的操弄論證解決方案，並提出我自己的軟線回應：信念條件。信念條件主張：當道德責任的判斷人對於行為者及其行為具備一定的知識，那麼，對他來說，行為者就對該行為沒有道德責任。信念條件作為道德責任的部份定義（partial definition）可以很容易地和市面上的相容論結合，使它們不再受到操弄論證威脅。
並列摘要
This thesis concerns the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism. It concentrates on responding to the manipulation arguments raised by the incompatibilists for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. In this thesis I first introduce and discuss the main theories in the compatibilists camp, and then various manipulation arguments from incompatibilists. Afterwards, I examine two kinds of compatibilists’ reply to the manipulation arguments, the soft-line reply and the hard-line reply. I argue that none of them provide satisfactory explanations to the intuitions in support the manipulation arguments. Finally, I propose an alternative soft-line reply. I explain how this reply offers appropriate explanation for our intuition about moral responsibility in cases introduced from the manipulation arguments, and how it helps compatibilist theories in responding to the manipulation arguments.