本研究主要探討三大法人(外資、投信、自營商)為主的機構投資人對於台上市公司的投資期限與企業投資對內部現金流量敏感度的相關性。研究期間為2002 年至2011 年,共計833間上市公司、6745 個觀察值,資料型態為追蹤資料(panel data)。從機構投資人監督的角色及資訊的角色探討機構投資人的投資持股是否會影響企業投資對現金流量的敏感度,本文認為機構投資人較長的投資期限有更多的激勵誘因進行有效的監督,可降低資訊不對稱和代理問題,進而降低了企業內部和外部資金的成本差異。研究結果發現,機構投資人持股期間越長,即機構投資人長期投資期限的存在,造成企業投資對內部現金流量的敏感度降低。
This paper examines the relation between institutional investment horizons and investment-cash flow sensitivity. This study used panel data which consists of 6,745 observations for 833 Taiwanese listed firms from 2002 to 2011. Based on the information collection and monitor ability of institutional investors, this paper investigates whether the institutional investors affect the firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity. We argue that institutional investor with longer investment horizon has more incentive to engage in effective monitoring and thus reduces asymmetric information and agency problems. As a result, the wedge between internal and external financing cost can be reduced. The empirical evidence shows that institutional investor with long investment horizon decreases the firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity.