台灣家族企業的報酬與風險態度之探討

本研究之主題為台灣傳統產業家族企業之風險態度與報酬之關係，過去之研究之大多以報酬為衡量家族企業與非家族企業的績效標準，切入角度多以代理理論或管家理論來詮釋研究之結果，而對於報酬與風險之關係少有相關之探討，故本文嘗試以行為財務學中有關公司風險與報酬的研究方法來探討國內傳統產業家族企業的風險態度，並加入相關公司治理變數來進行研究，成功證實即使是控制股東多為家族關係人的家族企業，當其面臨績效表現不佳時，風險態度亦會開始產生變化，由理性的風險趨避轉變為非理性的風險追求，進一步證明即便是家族企業亦會出現代理問題，在報酬表現不佳時追求風險進而出現傷害主理人之行為，因此應建立良好的公司治理機制，如此才可有效的防止弊端及降低代理問題發生的機率與可能性。

關鍵字

風險；家族企業；行為財務學

並列摘要

The subject of this study is to investigate the relationship between risk attitude and return of Taiwan's family owned business. In previous studies, they used return as performance standards of family owned and non-family owned business, and mostly focus on agency or stewardship theory to interpret the research. As a result, there is no relevant discussion about the relationship between return and risk. Therefore, this research attempts to explore the risk attitudes of domestic family owned business by using research methods of corporate finance and rewards in behavioral finance, and join relevant corporate governance variables. The study has successfully confirmed that even if the family owned business whose controlling shareholders are mostly family-related persons, when it faces poor performance, the risk attitude will begin to change, shifting from rational risk escalation to irrational risk pursuing, which further proves that family-owned companies will also have agency problems. They will pursue risks when their performance is poor, and this decision might affect the company. Therefore, a good corporate governance mechanism should be established so as to effectively prevent and reduce the probability of agency problems.