強制性財務預測與法人說明會關聯性之研究

Mandated Financial Forecast and Conference Calls

金成隆(Chen-Lung Chin) ； 紀信義(Hsin-Yi Chi) ； 林裕凱(Yu Kai Lin)

《管理學報》 22卷5期 (2005/10) Pp. 629-651

https://doi.org/10.6504/JOM.2005.22.05.04

摘要

我國自民國八十年開始實施強制性財務預，而強制性財務預測偏離實際盈餘是一種常見的現象，誤差可能起因於不可測的不確定因素，也可能是管理當局蓄意操控所致。本研究檢測財務預測誤差的這兩類原因，對於事後召開法人說明會與否的影響。本研究以民國八十六年至九十一年上市櫃公司為樣本。實證結果發現：⑴當強制性財務預測誤差起因於不可控因素時，管理當局會傾向於召開法人說明會做進一步說明；⑵相對的，如果是起因於管理當局蓄意操控財務預測，事後管理當局就比較不會召開法說會做進一步的補充說明。此一結果顯示，由於法說會雖然可以提供資訊（量化與非量化），補充財務預測（量化）的不足，但召開與否卻受到財務預測誤差產生的原因的影響。

關鍵字

強制性財務預測 ； 法人說明會

並列摘要

In 1991, Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) requires inclusion of mandated financial forecast in prospectus. Deviation of mandatory earnings forecasts from reported earnings is very pervasive for listed firm in Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). The earnings forecasts errors would arise either from uncertainty inherent in environment or from manipulation of firm's managers. The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether likelihood of　firm's manager conducting conference calls vary with the sources for earnings forecasts errors. The results provide evidence that the tendency of manager to conduct conference calls increase with earnings errors arising from uncertainty inherent in environment, while the tendency decrease with manipulated forecast errors.

並列關鍵字

Mandatory earnings forecast ； conference calls

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