台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素：代理成本與放款者利益衝突假說

本研究的主要目的即在於分析銀行持有其借款企業股份及進入其董監事會之動機與影響。我們首先探討借款企業之特性與銀行持有企業股權及進入其董監事會的關係，進而了解銀行持股且進入董監事會之動機，即是降低代理成本或減少放款者利益衝突。另外，我們也比較持有借款企業股權的銀行是否會給予其借款企業較佳的融資條件。主要實證結果顯示在整體樣本下，日平均報酬率、有形資產比例、公開發行負債比例越高，則會增加銀行進入借款企業董監事會的機率，支持利益衝突假說。另外發現銀行進入大小借款企業董監事會之決定因素也所不同，在大企業樣本下，當日平均報酬率、有形資產比例、公開發行負債比例越高及金融機構負債比例越小時，則銀行進入借款企業董監事會的機率越高，故在大企業樣本下支持利益衝突假說。在小企業樣本下，當借款企業資產規模越小、金融機構負債比例越高時，則銀行進入借款企業董監事會的機率越高，故在小企業樣本支持代理成本假說。再者，本研究發現有銀行進入董監事會的借款企業相較無銀行進入董事會者可以取得較佳的放款條件，即是有銀行進入董監事會的借款企業可取得較低的放款加碼利率及較高融資額度。我們進一步發現相較非董事銀行，董事銀行與借款公司訂定的放款條件中會給予較低的融資額度且要求公司提供擔保品的機會提高。此結果顯示銀行在進入董監事會後，面臨同時身為股東與債權人的利益衝突，所以銀行會減少融資額度、提高擔保放款契約承做機率以來消除本身的利益衝突。

關鍵字

銀行；銀行持股；代理成本；放款者利益衝突；公司治理

並列摘要

A board linkage may reduce the costs of information flows between the lender and borrower, however, the potential conflict of lender's interest may generate when a bank executive is on the board of a non-financial firm. The fiduciary duty of directors to promote the interests of shareholders can lead to a conflict with the banker-director's role as lender or potential lender due to different payoff structures of debt and equity. Hence, there are tradeoffs between the benefits from direct bank monitoring and the costs of active bank involvement in firm management. In this paper, we investigate the motivations and effects of banks to hold equity and participate in the boards of their borrowers. We utilize the agency and lenders' conflict of interest hypotheses explaining why banks hold equity stakes of borrowing firms. The characteristics of the business in which banks are also shareholders and directors are examined. Moreover, we also analyze whether banker on non-financial firm's board affect the terms of loan contract and explore the relations between the bank equity stakes and the loan terms of the borrowing firms. Firstly, the empirical results reveal that banks are more likely to enter the boards of the businesses with higher profitability, higher proportions of tangible assets, and higher public debt ratio in the whole sample and for large firms these results are more consistent with the lenders' conflict of interest hypothesis. Secondly, in the sub-sample of small firms, banks tend to be on the boards of smaller size, and with higher proportion of liabilities from financial institutions, supporting agency costs hypothesis. Thirdly, firms with any banks on their boards receive more favorable loan terms, including lower spread rate and larger credit line. However, banks grant loans of lower size and more collateralized loans to the firms they are also on boards in order to alleviate the problems of lenders' conflict of interest.