Strategic Impression Management Preceding Family CEO Succession

家族接班人繼任前之策略性印象管理

翁鶯娟(Ying-Jiuan Wong) ； 林玟君(Wen-Chun Lin) ； 張紹基(Shao-Chi Chang)

《管理學報》 33卷2期 (2016/06) Pp. 253-280

https://doi.org/10.6504/JOM.2016.33.02.07

摘要

家族企業進行接班時所產生的資訊不對稱問題，常為阻礙家族特殊資產傳承的主要因素。管理利害關係人對家族接班人的印象為家族企業進行接班時保留家族特殊資產的重要策略。本文試圖填補目前印象管理與家族繼承文獻之缺口，探討在家族繼任者接班前，企業為順利傳承家族特殊資產，是否利用盈餘管理的方式對利害關係人進行策略性印象管理。研究結果發現當接班人為家族成員時，接班前盈餘管理的程度顯著增加。較資淺的家族接班人，接班前盈餘管理程度高於較資深者。此外，前任CEO 自願離職，創辦人仍任職於董事會，與家族持有較高股權時，接班前之盈餘管理的程度相對較高。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 創辦人 ； 家族繼承 ； 印象管理

並列摘要

A critical issue for family businesses is how to successfully transfer specific assets associated with stakeholders to later generations as high information asymmetry regarding family heirs during succession prevents the transition of these assets. An important strategy that facilitates the continued reservation of the specific assets for the firm upon CEO succession is to manage stakeholders’ impression toward the incoming family CEO. This study contributes to the literature on impression management and family succession by analyzing how a family firm’s behavior is affected in terms of its impression management strategy of increasing its level of upward earnings management prior to the CEO turnover. We found that earnings management significantly increases only when the incoming CEO is a family heir. Moreover, the results showed that firms with a succeeding family CEO who has lower seniority experienced a higher level of earnings management. The evidence further suggests that pre-turnover earnings management is greater when CEO turnover is voluntary, when the founder still serves on the board, and when there is a higher percentage of family ownership.

並列關鍵字

Earnings Management ； Family Founder ； Family Succession ； Impression Management

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