本文建立一多國籍廠商海外營運決策之經濟模型,藉由賽局理論的往前推論法,得出廠商最適海外進入模式決策,亦即直接進入或採收購方式進入海外市場。一旦外商進入模式確定後,則需要進一步考量技術移轉之多寡,雖然技術移轉可降低多國籍廠商邊際成本,然此技術可能免費外溢予地主國廠商,使之成為潛在競爭者而養虎貽患,是故如何權衡得失,進行技術移轉亦是本文探討的重點。研究發現:技術外溢將影響多國籍廠商的進入策略,同時影響地主國廠商獲益、及多國籍廠商受損的程度。當外溢程度愈大,多國籍廠商較無能力支付昂貴之收購金,因而將採取直接進入模式,且此時之技術移轉量與產出均較低,如此外溢帶來的潛在競爭效果比收購時來得小。反之,若外溢程度愈小,在技術移轉成本及廠商競爭程度較小之地主國環境下,外商較偏好採收購模式。技術外溢影響廠商間競爭及外商移轉技術的意願,也引導出地主國的科技政策方向,因此技術外溢對企業海外投資活動著實扮演重要角色。
We develop a model of foreign operations to determine a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) choice between direct entry or acquisition, technology transfer level and output strategy. They are solved by three-stage game model under considering technology spillover. The spillover has effect on market competition and the incentive of technology transfer for MNEs. It depends on the spillover degree whether host firms are beneficial or MNEs are damaged. If the spillover degree is higher, MNEs will adopt direct entry and the technology transfer level is lower than it under acquisition. On the contrary, MNEs prefer acquisition if the spillover is lower in the host market of lower transfer cost and market competition.