兩岸對政治談判的評估及因應策略分析

Bilateral Evaluations of and Tactics in Cross - Strait Political Negotiations

張執中(Chih-Chung Chang)

《問題與研究》 41卷1期 (2002/01) Pp. 25-50

https://doi.org/10.30390/ISC.200201_41(1).0002

摘要

兩岸主權問題的互斥性，完全彰顯在兩岸政治關係上。台灣與大陸當局在「兩岸定位」與「未來走向」的認知差距與缺乏互信，使評估的均衡點長期在「對等／安全」與「防獨／促統」間擺盪，用以權衡「接受條件」、「沒有協議」與「繼續談判」，何者可以獲致最優的條件。本文旨在分析不同時期，兩岸談判背後的權力與價值，以及策略運用對現狀的影響。台灣雖然歷經「政黨輪替」，改變了國共內戰史觀，但新政府仍須面對中共「一中原則」與「一國兩制」的協商框架；不同的是，國內朝野「共識圈」（win-set）的分裂，影響了談判的權力與策略的運用；兩岸議題的相互掛鉤、「經發會」共識的落實與加入世貿後的「三通」，使新政府較過去更難以拒絕談判。中共自信擁有時間的優勢，刻意使對手處於依賴地位，讓我方不得不重新估算「抗衡」的成本，包括籌碼使用的控制、「堅持立場」對政治能量的消耗，以及冗長的談判過程阻礙其他重要議題的發展。如何在兩岸競合關係上，爭取更多時間與機會，正考驗著新政府的能力。

關鍵字

兩岸關係 ； 政治談判 ； 均衡點 ； 雙層賽局 ； 共識圈 ； 策略

並列摘要

Since sovereignty is a vital national interest, the political negotiations between Mainland china and Taiwan fall within the realm of a zero-sum game. Both sides insist on different interpretations of the issues of both political identity and the future resolution of the cross-strait relationship. Taipei pays close attention to parity and security, while Beijing’s focus is on opposing independence and promoting unification. According to these break-even points of evaluation, decision-makers must aggregate many diverse estimates into over-all values. They must decide whether agreement as well as to all the prospects and risks of further bargaining. This paper analyses the power and values of cross-strait negotiation tactics that parties with different power structures employ, as well as the influences and out-comes of the status quo.
Despite democratic Progressive Party (DPP) member Chen Shui-bian assuming the presidency – thereby stopping the possibility of a third round of CCP-KMT cooperation for unification, the new government still must deal with china’s formula of “one country, two system” and her “one China” policy. “Win-set” divisions among the domestic political parties influences Taiwan’s bargaining power and strategy. At the same time, the two sides have developed increasing trade interdependence over the past few years. Relatively speaking, however, Taiwan has become more dependent on the Mainland, Beijing believes that time is on its side, with its adversary in a dependent position. The DPP government must re-estimate the cost of controlling resource use; sustaining commitment depletes political energy and a drawn-out negotiation process will interfere with the government’s ability to focus on other important foreign and domestic issues. The government must seek both time and opportunity in managing cross-strait ties.

並列關鍵字

cross-strait relations ； political negotiation ； break-even point ； two-level game ； win-set ； tactics

參考文獻

Bacharach, S. B., Lawler, E. J.(1981).Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes.San Francisco:Jossey-Bass.

Blackman, C.(1997).Negotiating China-Case Studies and Strategies.Australia:Allen ＆ Unwin Pty Ltd..

Burton, J. W.(1986).International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice.Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Cline, R. S.(1975).World Power Assessment.Washington, D. C.:Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cottam, M.(1998).International Symposium on Political Negotiations between Taiwan and Mainland China.Taipei:Graduate Institute of San Min Chu I, National Taiwan University.