全無預設的哲學?－論胡塞爾與黑格爾

本文探討「無預設哲學」的理念，主要圍繞胡塞爾和黑格爾兩位哲學家。他們都極力完成這種嚴格哲學的理想，卻選擇兩種不同的進路，分別代表基礎主義和融貫主義的知識理念。胡塞爾繼承笛卡兒的傳統，追求絕對可靠的開端和基點，再以嚴格的方法建立系統；黑格爾卻認為根本沒有直接知識或無預設的開端，只有「系統整體」才能滿足無預設性的要求。本文首先整理笛卡兒式基礎主義的背景，以及胡塞爾如何以現象學方法嘗試實現嚴格哲學的理想。然後分析黑格爾對這種理路的批評，以及他如何以思辯哲學的方法重新詮釋「無預設性」的意義，最後討論胡塞爾晚年的轉向。

關鍵字

胡塞爾；黑格爾；無預設性；基礎主義；融貫主義

並列摘要

This paper deals with the idea of presuppositionless philosophy, thereby focusing on Husserl and Hegel. While striving to realize this age-old idea, they adopt different strategies, based on epistemological foundationalism and coherentism respectively. Husserl follows the Cartesian tradition to search for an indubitable foundation and absolute beginning on which to build a rigorous system of knowledge. Hegel, however, rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge or presuppositionless beginning, and maintains that the characterization of presuppositionlessness can only be applied to the system as a whole. After briefly reviewing Descartes' foundationalist idea, the paper examines Husserl's attempt to realize it through his phenomenological method. It then proceeds to analyze Hegel's criticism of the demand of an absolute foundation, explaining how he reinterprets the idea of presuppositionlessness in his speculative philosophy. The paper ends with some remarks on Husserl's later development.