現象學懸擱的難題－論胡塞爾之超驗現象學的起點

The Problem of the Phenomenological Epoché: An Inquiry to the Starting Point for Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

羅麗君(Lee-Chun Lo)

《東吳哲學學報》 24期 (2011/08) Pp. 23-45

https://doi.org/10.29732/SJPS.201108.0002

摘要

現象學懸擱是胡塞爾為進入超驗現象學研究所提出來的第一個基礎方法，然而，後世學者卻不斷針對此方法的操作效用提出以下質疑：第一、到底何謂現象學懸擱？比方法操作的意義、方式、對象、目的和效應是什麼？第二、「超驗哲學」或「超驗現象學」之建立與懸擱方法的運作又有何關係？針對以上種種問題進行反省與釐清，即為本文的論述主旨。

關鍵字

現象學懸擱 ； 超驗現象學 ； 自然態度 ； 總命題

並列摘要

The phenomenological epoché is the first fundamental method by which Husserl could begin studying the transcendental phenomenology. However, there are reflections and questions on the operation of this method as follows: Firstly, what kind of method is the phenomenological epoché? How can its meaning, function, object, purpose or effect be exactly comprehended? Secondly, which relationship is between the establishment of ”the transcendental philosophy,” namely ”the transcendental phenomenology,” and the phenomenological epoché? And this article is aimed at giving an explanation for the problems mentioned above.

並列關鍵字

the phenomenological epoché ； the transcendental phenomenology ； the natural attitude ； general positing

參考文獻

倪梁康編(1999)。胡塞爾：現象學概念通釋。北京:三聯書局。

Moran, D.(Ed.),Embree, L. E.(Ed.)(2004).Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy.London:Routledge.

Husserl, E.,Boehm, R.(hrsg.)(1959).Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion.Den Haag:Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E.,Biemel, W.(hrsg.)(1962).Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie.Den Haag:Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E.,Biemel, W.(hrsg.)(1968).Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925.Den Haag:Martinus Nijhoff.