費希特與作為方法的「人類精神的實用歷史」

Fichte and the Pragmatic History of the Human Spirit as a Method

史偉民(Wei-Min Shi)

《東吳哲學學報》 28期 (2013/08) Pp. 71-95

摘要

費希特的人類精神的實用歷史的構想，通常被視為他的現象學方法，而與作為建構法的歸謬辯證有所不同。本文主張：前者植基於一個產生於極端的自由概念的自我概念。藉著分析費希特有關歸謬辯證與人類精神的實用歷史、獨斷論與觀念論的陳述，可以看出：費希特並未能證成現象學觀察與建構的方法論區分。這使人質疑作為其基礎的自我概念。

關鍵字

費希特 ； 知識學 ； 意識

並列摘要

Fichte's conception of a pragmatic history of the human spirit is usually taken to be his phenomenological method as differing from the apagogic dialectic as his constructive method. It is argued in this paper that the former is rooted in a concept of the I resulting from a radicalized concept of freedom. The analysis of what Fichte says about the apagogic dialectic, the pragmatic history of the human spirit, dogmatism and idealism yet reveals that he fails to justify the methodological distinction between the phenomenological observation and construction, which makes the concept of the I questionable that is the foundation of the distinction.

並列關鍵字

Fichte ； Science of Knowledge ； consciousness

參考文獻

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