對於諾以的槪念多元論的檢視：來自梅洛龐蒂的啓發

A Critical Examination of Alva Noë's Concept Pluralism: Inspired by Merleau-Ponty

鄭喜恒(Hsi-Heng Cheng)

《東吳哲學學報》 46期 (2023/02) Pp. 41-72

摘要

諾以提出了概念多元論來回應「智性主義」與「反智性主義」關於知覺的爭論。他論證說，概念多元論可以取代智性主義來更好地說明知覺的理解是概念性的理解。但筆者認為，他仍然過於偏向智性主義。筆者依據梅洛龐蒂的思路，提出了理解多元論與辯證統合論來解釋思維與知覺等能力之間的差異與關連。整體而言，筆者提出的這套論述比諾以的概念多元論更好地調和了「智性主義」與「反智性主義」關於知覺的爭論，因為這套論述既可以解釋與接納諾以所說的智性主義洞見與概念多元論，也可以解釋與包容反智性主義的「知覺比思維更為基礎」的核心想法。

關鍵字

梅洛龐蒂 ； 諾以 ； 概念多元論 ； 知覺 ； 智性主義

並列摘要

Alva Noë proposes Concept Pluralism as a solution to the debate about perception between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, arguing that Concept Pluralism can better explain how perceptual understanding is conceptual. However, it looks to me that Concept Pluralism inclines too much towards intellectualism and presupposes Understanding Monism, that is, the thesis that conceptual understanding is the only mode of understanding. Inspired by Merleau-Ponty, I suggest both Understanding Pluralism and Dialectic Integrationism to account for the relation between thought and perception. I argue that my suggestion is promising in that it can better reconcile intellectualism and anti-intellectualism than Noë's Concept Pluralism.

並列關鍵字

Merleau-Ponty ； Alva Noë ； concept pluralism ； perception ； intellectualism

參考文獻

Noë, A. (2015). Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open Mind: 27(T). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: MIND Group. (doi: 10.15502/9783958570597)

Carmen, T. (2012). Foreword. In D. A. Landes (Trans.), Phenomenology of Perception (pp. vii-xvi). London & New York: Routledge.

Dewey, J. (1980). The Middle Works of John Dewey: Vol. 9. Democracy and Education. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.

Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual Knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22, 3/4: 455-479.