論Pritchard對基礎難題的回應

On Pritchard's Responses to the Basis Problem

郭仲謙(Kwok, Chung-him) ； 蕭銘源(Hsiao, Ming-yuan)

《臺大文史哲學報》 預刊文章 Pp. 1-24

https://doi.org/10.6258/bcla.202111/PP.0003

摘要

在近年知識論的討論中，Pritchard以一系列文章辯護知覺知識的選言主義（ED），其核心論點之一是主張「看見p是一種對知道p的合理支持」。另一方面，Williamson、Cassam與部分學者主張「蘊涵論題」：看見p就是知道p。如果蘊涵論題成立，ED的主張就會被理解成一種自我支持因而不令人滿意，一般稱此為「基礎難題」。對此，Pritchard提出「有利場景論題」（OGT），主張看見p只是身處於客觀上有利於知道p的場景，並以此化解基礎難題。不過，Ghijsen對Pritchard的解決方案提出兩類反對意見：第一，Pritchard用來支持OGT的案例並不可信；第二，OGT本身有反例。本文論證，Ghijsen對Pritchard的批評是基於一種對ED的不恰當理解，因此他的反駁並不成立。

關鍵字

知覺知識的選言主義 ； 基礎難題 ； 蘊涵論題 ； 有利場景論題

並列摘要

In recent discussions in epistemology, Pritchard defends epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge (ED). Specifically, one of the crucial theses of ED is that seeing that p is a kind of rational support for knowing that p. On the other hand, Williamson and Cassam, among others, advocate the entailment thesis: seeing that p is a specific way of knowing that p. If the entailment thesis were true, the kind of rational support ED proposes would be self-supporting, and ED would thereby be unsatisfactory. This problem with ED is called the basis problem. In order to defend ED, Pritchard rejects the entailment thesis. He argues that seeing that p is not a specific way of knowing that p; instead, seeing that p is just being in an objectively epistemically good position to know that p. This thesis is called the objectively epistemically good scenario thesis (OGT). Nevertheless, Ghijsen argues against Pritchard for two reasons. Firstly, the case Pritchard deploys for supporting OGT is not convincing. Secondly, there are counter examples to OGT. In this article, we argue that Ghijsen's criticisms stem from an inappropriate understanding of Pritchard's account, and that his objections are therefore untenable.

並列關鍵字

Epistemological Disjunctivism of Perceptual Knowledge ； the Basis Problem ； the Entailment Thesis ； the Objectively Epistemically Good Scenario Thesis

參考文獻

Fratantonio, Giada. 2019. “Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.” Episteme : 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.26.

Ghijsen, Harmen. 2015. “The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited.” Erkenntnis 80: 1147-156. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9715-9.

Kraft, Tim. 2015. “Epistemological Disjunctivism’s Genuine Access Problem.” Theoria 81(4): 311-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12075 .

Pritchard, Duncan. 2011. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 434-55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00210.x.

Pritchard, Duncan. 2012b. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” The Journal of Philosophy 109 (3): 247-79. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201210939.