再探訪朱熹格物致知論：並從德性知識論的視域略論其可能性與限制

A New Approach to Zhu Xi's Theory of Investigation and Knowledge: in Perspective of Virtue Epistemology

沈享民(Hsiang-Min Shen)

《哲學與文化》 39卷2期 (2012/02) Pp. 69-102

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.201202.0071

摘要

本文試圖自新興的德性知識論，透視朱熹的格物致知說，提出一嶄新的詮釋。「智的德性」是德性知識論的核心概念，智的德性與道德德性或其它德性的關係是其重要論題；本文即從這兩方面重建朱熹的格物致知論。在對格物致知提出基本的疏解之後，本文論證的重要步驟如下：一、格物窮理最好被視為探究活動，其探究的對象涵蓋道德知識；二、格物致知的探究預設心之虛靈知覺的能力；三、心之知覺即是智的德性（或簡稱為「智」）；四、就智的德性與道德德性或其它德性的關係這一方面而言，朱熹論證：知覺作為智德不等同於仁，而仁包含智；五、敬是探究活動與道德實踐的共同德性。以上諸要點，以德性知識論為參照座標，本文皆援引朱熹文獻以證實之。在結語部分，本文批判地反省格物致知論、以及上述詮釋進路的理論限制與缺失。

關鍵字

格物致知 ； 智的德性 ； 朱熹 ； 德性知識論

並列摘要

This paper tries to propose a new approach to the theory of investigation and knowledge in Zhu Xi's philosophy. This approach is inspired by virtue epistemology which newly arises in the recent development of Anglo-Amcrican philosophy. Among the main elements o f virtue epistemology, the concept of intellectual is the hard core; and the relationship between intellectual virtue and moral virtue or other virtues is needed to be explained in a system of virtue epistemology. I do not claim that the theory of knowledge in Zhu Xi's philosophy is exactly a kind of virtue epistemology, however. My aim and my strategy are to parallel virtue epistemology to ground Zhu Xi's theory upon intellectual virtue, and to explicate the relation between intellectual virtue (智) and humaneness (仁), the all-embracing and cardinal virtue) . The argument goes as follows: At first, I interpret ge-wu as a certain kind of inquiry or investigation. The extension of Knowledge, which is what zhi-zhi (致知) means, is the actual proof of efficacy that results from activities of inquiry. Secondly, I argue that Zhu Xi's doctrine of ge-wu zhi-zhi presupposes his theory of mental capacity or competence, the mental function of apt and luminous perception. Thirdly, in my interpretation Zhu xi argued that the mental competence is precisely intellectual virtue. In this respect, he would agree to Ernest Sosa, the most famous virtue epistemologist, who similarly identifies intellectual virtues with cognitive faculties, abilities or competence. Furthermore, Zhu xi made clear that intellectual virtue is incorporated into the cardinal virtue, humaneness. At last, as Linda Zagzebski, a virtue epistemologist, has pointed out that there are some virtues which are shared by morality and knowledge, I argue similarly that Zhu Xi proposed reverence (敬, Jing, seriousness) as the common or mediate virtue, maintained that it is indispensable both in the cognitive inquiry and in moral practice. In concluding remark, I discuss critically the limits and the theoretical faults in this interpretation of Zhu Xi's ge-wu zhi-zhi described above.

並列關鍵字

Ge-Wu Zhi-Zhi ； Intellectual Virtue ； Zhu Xi ； Virtue Epistemology

參考文獻

程顥、程頤(1983)。二程集。臺北:漢京文化。

朱熹(2001)。四書或問。上海:上海古藉。

Axtell, Guy(1996).Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?.The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.10(3),172-198.

Greco, John(2000).Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.LX(1),179-184.

Sosa, Ernest(1991).Knowledge in Perspective.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.