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  • 期刊

主體的自我vs.現象的自我--從主體自我理論回應麥清格的自我幻覺理論

Subjective Self vs. Phenomenal Self-From the Theories of Subjective Self to Respond Matzinger's Self-illusion Theory

摘要


近年來由於腦科學與認知科學研究的蓬勃發展,許多與此相關的跨學科研究紛紛上路,並且影響了傳統人觀的神、哲學觀點。本文期望藉由麥清格「現象的第一人稱觀點」∕「現象的自我」之理論,呈現出整合人文學科與腦科學研究的一種模式,並且繼續藉由查爾默斯、班尼特與海克、戴維森、納格爾、柏格森之不同哲學觀點之回應,以及祁克果關涉超越的主體自我論點,提出暨是整合腦科學研究,仍能持有主體自由意志之人觀的可能。論文旨在探究不同的方法論觀點,而非在於論述整合的方法。

關鍵字

自我 心智 意識 腦科學 主體 麥清格 祁克果 不可共量

並列摘要


During these years the research achievements of brain science and cognitive science promote innumerable interdisciplinary studies and have great influences on the traditional concepts of theological and philosophical anthropology. In this article the theory of Metzinger's phenomenal first person's view/phenomenal self will be discussed in order to present an integrative model of brain science and humanities. After that the viewpoints of Chalmers, Bennett and Hacker, Davidson, Nagel and Bergson will be philosophical responses to Metzinger's anthropology and Kierkegaard's subjective self according to Transcendence as theological response. The theme of this article will focus on investigating different Methodology but not on the methods of interdisciplinary integration. In the end it will demonstrate the possibility to integrate the knowledge of brain science and at the same time to keep the view of subjective free will in anthropology.

參考文獻


Bennett, M.R.,Hacker, P.M.S.,Schulte, J.(Trans)(2010).Neurowissenschaft und Philosophie.Berlin:Suhrkamp.
Bennett, M.R.,Hacker, P.M.S.(2003).Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.Oxford:Blackwell.
Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by T. E. Hulme. New York/London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1911

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