王陽明與黃梨洲「心體說」之合會可能

On the Similarities between Wang Yang-ming's and Huang Zong-xi's Doctrines of Mind-Body

蔡家和(Chia-He TSAI)

《哲學與文化》 45卷4期 (2018/04) Pp. 19-33

摘要

這篇文章將對王陽明與黃梨洲之心體諸說進行探討。此二人立說之問題意識不同，陽明學主張「即本體即工夫」，此是針對程朱學「用工夫以復本體」而發；而黃宗羲之主張「心無本體」，則是在其《明儒學案》肯定諸家學說脈絡下所做成；這並非否定「心之本體」，而是強調把本體散於各種工夫之中。《明儒學案》的問題意識，是面對明代諸儒而予以收攝並肯認，此與孫奇逢、周海門等執於一偏之見而撰作的儒學史不同。又陽明曾言：「心無體，以天地萬物感應之是非為體。」可見陽明學亦非必定執於心之為體，此心體係可散於萬物，而與萬物感通為一。如此一來，則黃宗羲與陽明之間似可有一合會。這篇文章將對陽明「心之本體」與黃宗羲「心無本體」兩者異同做一比較與爬梳。

關鍵字

本體 ； 工夫 ； 陽明 ； 《明儒學案》 ； 心

並列摘要

This article is to inquire Wang Yang-ming's and Huang Zong-xi's doctrines of mind-body. With distinct questions consciousnesses, Wang's claim of ＂the original substance as moral cultivation＂ was a response to the Neo-Confucian idea of ＂restoring the original substance through moral cultivation,＂ while Huang's claim of ＂mind without the original substance＂ was formed to approve the doctrines of various schools, which didn't disapprove ＂the original substance of mind＂ but rather highlight its applications to all kinds of moral cultivations. The question consciousness of Records of Ming Scholars is to collect and approve all Confucians of the Ming Dynasty, distinct from Sun Qifeng's and Zhou Ru-deng's partial renditions of the history of Confucianism. On the other hand, Wang Yang Ming was not obsessed with mind as the original substance, since it could be applied to all creatures and things. Therefore, Huang and Wang seemed to have something in common. This article is to compare and analyze the differences and similarities between Wang's ＂the original substance of mind＂ and Huang's ＂mind without the original substance.＂

並列關鍵字

Original Substance ； Moral Cultivation ； Wang Yang-ming ； Records of Ming Scholars ； Mind

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