荀子思想中的化性起偽與道德動機——兼覆林宏星教授

Moral Motivation and the Transformation of Nature and the Rise of Artifice in Xunzi's Thought-Plus A Reply to Professor Hongxing Lin

鄧小虎(Siufu TANG)

《哲學與文化》 45卷10期 (2018/10) Pp. 113-127

摘要

長久以來，荀子思想都面對兩個互相關聯的批評：一個是關於道德基礎的問題，即荀子的性惡論無法解釋仁義道德的來源；另一個是關於道德動機的問題，即性惡論無法解釋人們如何可以做出為道德而道德的行為。對於禮義道德的創制或者起源問題，學者們大致有共識：即禮義道德作為一種規範和制度，是長期的文明發展和文化演變的成果。可是對於道德動機的問題，學者們還未有統一的答案。本文藉著釐清「化性」和「起偽」的關係，嘗試回答荀子思想中的道德動機的問題。本文指出，道德動機起源於道德活動和道德實踐，而道德活動和道德實踐，則是一個文化和傳統通過「積思慮、習偽故」的積習過程所生成的，代表了人類對於自身及美好生活的自我詮釋和經驗累積。

關鍵字

荀子 ； 性 ； 偽 ； 禮義 ； 道德動機

並列摘要

Xunzi's thought has long been criticized for failing to address two interrelated problems. First, Xunzi seems to be unable to explain the origin of moral norms, for if people's nature is bad, how can they recognize and give rise to moral norms? Second, Xunzi seems to be unable to explain the question of moral motivation, for how can people of a bad nature be motivated to act morally for morality's sake? Xunzi scholars tend to agree that moral norms are not constructed overnight, but are rather the results of generations of cultural contrivances. However they tend to disagree over the question of moral motivation. This paper attempts to answer the question of moral motivation through a further articulation of the relationship between nature and artifice. This paper suggests that moral motivation is derived from participation in moral activities and moral practice, while the latter are constructed through an accumulative process of thought and deliberation, activities and customs. Such an accumulative process, in its turn, represents a self-interpretation of human beings and the good life by a cultural tradition.

並列關鍵字

Xunzi ； Nature ； Artifice ； Ritual and Appropriateness ； Moral Motivation

參考文獻

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何淑靜，《荀子再探》，臺北：臺灣學生書局，2014。

東方朔，《合理性之尋求：荀子思想研究論集》，臺北：臺大出版中心，2011。

林宏星、徐凱，〈情性與道德轉化——荀子論「化性起偽」如何可能〉，《社會科學》4(2018): 121-129

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