論荀子人性論以「道德之極」為「禮」之意義

On ＂Rite＂ as the ＂Supreme Morality＂ in Xunzi’s Doctrine of Human Nature

黃秋韻(Chiu-yun HUANG)

《哲學與文化》 45卷11期 (2018/11) Pp. 137-151

摘要

傳統心性論的特色是其理論可貫穿「心」、「性」、「情」三者，使道德動機與實踐歷程兩者合一，使心性之學有一致性的論述，同時，亦根據此而批評荀子之「性」欠缺道德實踐動機。然而，此種心性論型態之形上觀點的合理性亦受到學者質疑，認為它無法正面處理物質性欲求的情感。因此，本文認為在物質欲望、物質性的科技文明全面籠絡吾人生活之際，荀子的論述縱然較為疏漏，但其自然之性以及提升「禮」為「道德之極」的說法可重新加以檢視，反思此「中間一段」的「道德」是否確有其社會功能；同時，反思荀子學說之設定並了解其理論定位，可避免層次混淆的比較與批評。

關鍵字

荀子 ； 人性論 ； 禮 ； 性 ； 化性起偽

並列摘要

The traditional doctrine of mind-nature is characterized by its application to ＂mind,＂ ＂nature＂ and ＂feelings,＂ uniting the moral motivation with the practical process while making the statements on mind-nature coherent; also, from this perspective, Xunzi's concept of human nature lacks the motivation for moral practice. However, the rationality of such a doctrine of mind-nature as a metaphysical perspective is also questioned by many scholars, as they think it is unable to address the feelings for material desires. Therefore, it is believed in this article that, while material desires and materialistic civilization of technology appeal to us, we can re-examine Xunzi's statements about the essence of nature and how to upgrade ＂rite＂ to the ＂supreme morality＂ and contemplate whether such ＂morality＂ has any social function. Meanwhile, we should reflect on the settings of Xunzi's doctrine and understand its theoretical position in order to avoid confusing the differentiated levels of comparisons and criticisms.

並列關鍵字

Xunzi ； Doctrine of Human Nature ； Rite ； Nature ； Transformation and Development of Human Nature

參考文獻

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