Husserl's theory of feeling intentionality in the V. Logical Investigation has been accused of being founded upon objectifying intentionality and cannot do justice to feelings such as "mood" in Heidegger. On the other hand, Heidegger and, in his wake, Ratcliffe argue that there is a sort of "existential feeling" that is pre-objectifying in kind and it is in nature a bodily intentionality that directs itself at the world as such. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, I examine Husserl's genetic analysis of affection and argue that Husserl revises his early theory of feeling intentionality and his position turns out to be akin to Heidegger's; second, pace Heidegger and Ratcliffe, I argue that Husserl's detailed analysis of affection serves to better articulate the evaluative and the embodied feature of feeling intentionality.