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摘要


Which sort of idealism is defended by Plotinus? In this article, I want to prepare an answer to this difficult question by addressing the issue of sense-perception. As is shown in the paper, Plotinus neither subscribes to a representationalism nor to a naïve realism, nor does he formulate a subjective projectionism. Instead, sense-perception works on the basis of an interconnectedness between all bodily entities provided by the cosmic soul. Plotinus uses the Stoic term of sumpatheia to characterize this interrelatedness. His idealism is hence a monistic one.

並列摘要


普羅丁所捍衛的是哪一種的理念論呢?在這篇論文裡,我想要以處理感官知覺的議題準備來回答這個困難的問題。如同在這篇論文裡所表明的那樣,普羅丁既不贊成一種再現論,也不贊成一種素樸的實在論,他也不是構想一種主觀的投射論。相反地,感官知覺是在藉由宇宙魂所提供的所有物體的實體之間的互相聯繫的基礎上運作。普羅丁使用斯多葛的「共感」這個語詞去刻劃這種相互關聯性。因此,他的理念論是一種一元論的理念論。

並列關鍵字

知覺 再現 不可靠/絕對可靠 知識論

參考文獻


Arruzza, Cinzia. “Passive Potentiality in the Physical Realm: Plotinus’ Critique of Aristotle in Enneads II 5 [25],” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93.1(2011): 24-57.
Blumenthal, Henry Jacob. Plotinus’ Psychology. His Doctrine of the Embodied Soul. Den Hagg: Springer Netherlands, 1971.
Burnyeat, Myles Frederic. “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” Philosophical Review 91(1982): 3-40.
Chiaradonna, Ricardo. “Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense-Perception and Discursive Thought,” Topoi 31.2(2012): 191-207.
Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar. Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study. the UK: The Cambridge University Press, June, 2018.

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