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亞里斯多德主義原則-理解荀子善之依據的一種方法

Aristotelian Principle: One Way to Understand the Basis of Good of Xunzi

摘要


歷來認為,荀子思想因無法提供善之依據的說明,或許將走向極端的權威主義之路。但通過借鑒羅爾斯的「亞里斯多德主義原則」,善之依據可以被理解為旨在運用道德這一高級能力而獲得快樂的內在傾向。這一理解雖然可以為荀子思想提供關於道德動力的說明,擺脫權威主義的陷阱,但仍只是一種間接說明。借助休謨關於激情的觀點,這一間接說明可以轉變為一種直接說明,那就是:如果唯有衝動才可以對抗衝動,那麼也就唯有欲望化的道德才可以對抗不合理的欲望,同時,人們的實踐活動才能獲得真實的道德動力。

並列摘要


It has always been believed that Xunzi's thought may go to the extreme authoritarianism because it cannot provide the explanation of the basis of good. But by referring to Rawls's "Aristotelian principle", the basis of good can be understood as an internal tendency to obtain happiness through the use of virtue as a higher power. Although this understanding can provide the explanation of moral motivation for Xunzi's thought and get rid of the trap of authoritarianism, it is still an indirect explanation. By virtue of Hume's view of passion, this indirect statement can be transformed into a direct statement: if impulse alone can resist impulse, then only the morality of desire can resist unreasonable desire, and only in this way can people's practical activities gain real moral motivation.

參考文獻


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