認真看待脈絡－對法理學新典範的一些思考

Taking Context Seriously-Some Thoughts about the New Paradigms of Jurisprudence

顏厥安(Chueh-an YEN)

《哲學與文化》 49卷2期 (2022/02) Pp. 5-28

摘要

法理學並不容易發展出新典範。本文嘗試透過英語分析法理學從Austin到哈特的分離心態，來反思這個典範變遷問題。首先說明了Alexy對法哲學的兩種研究典範，廣褒理想與限縮準則。繼而檢討闡述了英美法理學分離心態的出現，分析法實證主義理論的限縮化，以及哈特自身理論的變遷。哈特終究仍以一種分離心態的觀點，區隔分離了法理學與政治哲學的內在關聯，也在分析哲學方面，選擇了J. L.奧斯丁，而非維根斯坦對脈絡的理解方式，繼而完全捨棄了社會法理學的研究方法。此一選擇深刻地影響塑造了過去半個多世紀英語世界法理學的發展風貌。然而為哈特所放棄的另外一種理論方向也藉由其他學者在過往三十年有了新的成長發展。如今新的典範已經呈現出一種「反分離心態」的廣褒面貌。本文對此也提供了兩個議題點的討論。

關鍵字

分析法理學 ； 法實證主義 ； 分離心態 ； 脈絡 ； 社會法理學 ； 觀點 ； 社會規則 ； J. L. 奧斯丁 ； 維根斯坦 ； 概念的縫隙性 ； 展演性言詞

並列摘要

It is not an easy job for jurisprudence to develop a new paradigm. In this paper I will try to make some reflections on the paradigm change of jurisprudence through examining the separation mentality of Anglo-phone analytical jurisprudence from Austin to Hart. Based on Alexy's distinction of the paradigm of legal philosophy, comprehensive ideal and restrictive maxim, I am going to discuss the emergence of separation mentality in analytical jurisprudence, the restrictive ambit of analytical legal positivism, and the development of Hart's theory. With separation mentality, Hart ultimately decided to isolate legal philosophy from political philosophy, accept J. L. Austin's rather than Wittgenstein's understanding of context, and abandon the research method of social jurisprudence completely. This choice had a great impact on Anglo-phone jurisprudence in the past half century. Nevertheless, the social jurisprudential approach abandoned by Hart also found its way out to flourish by other non-analytical minded scholars in the past few decades. Now we already have seen an ＂anti-separation mentality＂ paradigm of jurisprudence growing up. I also discuss two issues regarding this development briefly.

並列關鍵字

Analytical Jurisprudence ； Legal Positivism ； Separation Mentality ； Context ； Social Jurisprudence ； Point of View ； Social Rule ； J. L. Austin ； Wittgenstein ； Porosität der Begriffe ； Performative Utterances

參考文獻

Green, Leslie and Thomas Adams. “Legal Positivism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legal-positivism/(Retrieved 2021.12.5).

Hart, H. L. A. Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Hart, H. L. A. “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review 71.4(1958): 593-629.

Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 (2nd ed.).

Hart, H. L. A. “Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: Reply to Professor Bodenheimer,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 105.7(1957): 953-975.