其他可能性原則與因果決定論

有些相容論者相信其他可能性原則已為Frankfurt的反例所駁斥，而這讓支持因果決定與道德責任為相容的相容論者有機可乘。但捍衛其他可能性原則的不相容論者則堅持此原則，以及因果決定與道德責任的不相容性。在此篇論文中，我將論證Frankfurt的反例無法指出其他可能性的錯誤，但這不會導致不相容論的成立。事實上，我將證明，在一種對決定論與相容論的理解下，其他可能性原則與因果決定論及相容論者是相容的。

關鍵字

因果決定；相容論；責任；自由意志； Frankfurt ；不相容論；不決定論；動機

並列摘要

Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-style counterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specific understanding of determinism and compatibilism.